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ABSTRACT—This Article draws on Black American intellectual history to
offer an approach to fundamental questions of constitutional theory from the
standpoint of the politically excluded.
Democratic constitutional theory is vexed by a series of well-known
challenges rooted in the inability to justify law without democracy (“the
countermajoritarian difficulty”) and the inability to justify any particular
composition of the popular demos without law (“the problem of constituent
power”). Under conditions of genuine egalitarian political inclusion, a
constitutional conception of popular sovereignty derived primarily from the
civic republican constitutional patriotism associated with Jürgen Habermas
and others can resolve these challenges by providing a conceptual basis for
understanding the constitutional demos as a corporate body extending across
time and capable of ongoing political legitimation.
Unfortunately, the constitutional conception cannot justify states, such
as the United States, characterized by the persistent exclusion of some
legitimate members of the demos from political institutions. The resolution
to this problem can be found in an important tradition in Black American
constitutional thought, beginning with Frederick Douglass, which represents
American constitutional institutions as conditionally worthy of attachment
in virtue of their latent normative potential. The correct conception of
constitutional legitimacy for the United States combines Douglass’s insights,
and those of his intellectual heirs, with those working in the tradition which
Habermas represents.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article reaches into the history of Black American constitutional
thought to offer an account of constitutional democratic theory that can
explain why we ought to treat our Constitution as meaningful, even in the
face of the profoundly unjust exclusions woven deeply into its fabric. In
order to do so, it operates in three methodological domains. First is
“constitutional theory,” the discipline within law schools focusing on the
question of how governments and democratic citizens ought to respond to
their constitutions: Should they be obeyed? How should they be interpreted?
Second is “democratic theory,” the discipline within philosophy and political
science departments focusing on the question of what a government must
look like in order to be described as “democratic.” I contend that the core
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debates of constitutional theory depend on implicit (and false) assumptions
of democratic theory. Third is “intellectual history,” in particular, the history
of the responses of Black American activists and scholars to the concentric
series of exclusions (slavery, Jim Crow, mass incarceration) that have
comprised the relationship of Black Americans to their government.1
This Article argues that the best way to resolve the perennial debates
about the American Constitution’s compatibility with the ideals of
democracy is to borrow from two sources: (1) the civic republican
constitutional patriotism associated, inter alios, with constitutional theorists
Jürgen Habermas, Bruce Ackerman, Seyla Benhabib, and Frank Michelman
and (2) Black American thought about the American Constitution and
American democracy. From the constitutional patriots comes the idea that
constitutions are normatively prior to democratic legitimacy and not—as
most constitutional theory implicitly assumes—the other way around. From
Frederick Douglass, Ralph Ellison, Patricia Williams, and other Black
American democratic and constitutional thinkers comes the idea that there is
a way to treat an unjust, exclusionary constitution as democratically
legitimate in potentia and bootstrap it into legitimacy via the efforts of those
who struggle for inclusion.2
The argument of this Article proceeds in three Parts.
Part I describes the conventional, if implicit, theory of popular
sovereignty on which the core debates around the countermajoritarian
problem in constitutional theory have revolved. This theory, which I call the
“mechanical conception,” supposes that popular will-formation must
precede political outcomes and hence that legal acts that either resist the
popular will or are enacted without its pre-approval—including judicial
review—cannot be democratically legitimate. Part I then demonstrates that
this theory of popular sovereignty cannot serve to describe the preconditions
of democratic legitimacy.
Part II elucidates the main alternative to the conventional theory of
popular sovereignty. This alternative theoretical framework, which I call the
“constitutional conception,” is associated with the work of scholars in the
tradition of civic republican constitutional patriotism. It can explain how a
1 I do not, however, claim to be offering a historical thesis, but rather to be mining the wisdom of
Black constitutional thinkers throughout American history to reveal an underlying normative truth about
American democracy.
2 By “bootstrap it into legitimacy,” I mean that Douglass and his intellectual heirs teach us that even
an illegitimate Constitution can be a source of normative resources that can be used as a basis to demand
the social inclusion that the Constitution promises (however falsely). If these demands are successfully
satisfied, I will argue, that satisfaction can retroactively legitimate the Constitution. As I will show, this
is precisely the approach to the Constitution that resolves a flaw in the arguments of the constitutional
patriots.
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constitution like ours can both constitute and be the product of an ongoing
cross-generational public identity. That identity—the We the People or
demos—in turn, can make the Constitution compatible with the ideal of
popular sovereignty. Unfortunately, Part II also shows that such a theory
cannot justify our actual Constitution and our government in the real world
because our real-world Constitution has been marred by antidemocratic
exclusion, particularly, although not exclusively, of Black Americans. For
that reason, there is no We the People—the American demos has never been
properly constituted.
Finally, Part III draws out one response to that exclusion from a rich
history of Black American constitutional and democratic commentary. It
argues that even though the Constitution cannot be justified, we can find in
this tradition of thought some reason to act as if it is justified, in the course
of a continuing struggle to achieve the demos envisioned, in incomplete
form, by the Constitution.
I.

THE MECHANICAL CONCEPTION AND CONVENTIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Is the American government democratically legitimate? That is, do We,
the ostensibly democratic People of the United States, have any reason to
understand ourselves to be the authors of its Constitution, the judicial
decisions interpreting it, and the laws enacted under its authority?
It is typically supposed that, in order to be legitimate, a democratic state
must instantiate the property of “popular sovereignty,” which it achieves
when the people can be understood as the authors of its political outcomes.
But it is notoriously difficult to justify the thought that American institutions
are the product of popular authorship. There are many reasons to worry about
popular authorship in the United States, but the most important are twofold:
First, the Constitution was written and ratified by white men, many of
whom were slaveholders, in the eighteenth century—a population hardly
representative of the contemporary citizenry. Thus, how can we say that the
People alive today, who have different values and who include many who
would have been excluded under the initial framing act, have authored the
Constitution or political outcomes determined under it?
Second, even assuming the Constitution itself is legitimate, it is
arguably interpreted illegitimately—the Supreme Court gets to decide what
it means, making its decisions stick, and, in doing so, sometimes overrides
the will of the people expressed through their elected representatives. How
can the people be the authors of those legal outcomes when the best evidence
we have for what they actually wanted is the opposite?

338

114:335 (2019)

Reconstituting We the People

These, of course, are classic problems, and constitutional theory has
long struggled with them. As I contend, however, this body of theory has
implicitly—and mistakenly—rested on what I term the mechanical
conception of popular sovereignty. The mechanical conception is a set of
suppositions about what has to be true of a governmental structure for its
laws to be democratically legitimate. Put simply, the mechanical conception
consists of two features of government which are required for democratic
legitimacy.
First, the people must have a forward-looking mechanical power to
control political outcomes (legislation, social policy, war and peace, and so
forth) by operating the machinery of their political institutions, such as by
voting or exercising free speech.
Second, existing political institutions and outcomes must, in a
backward-looking sense, be the result of exercises of those mechanical
powers. They themselves must be brought about as a result of the people
operating their political machinery, as opposed to having been imposed on
the people from the outside.3
To see that compliance with the mechanical conception is a central
concern of constitutional theory, consider how it has been invoked to
underpin the central problem of constitutional theory—the
countermajoritarian problem.
In the words of Professor Barry Friedman, “to the extent that democracy
entails responsiveness to popular will, how to explain a branch of
government whose members are unaccountable to the people, yet have the
power to overturn popular decisions?”4 Professor Steven Calabresi sees the
countermajoritarian problem as about “disempower[ing] current majorities
from ruling either in the name of a majority of white male property owners
that died out more than 150 years ago or because a current majority of nine
unelected elite lawyers do not agree with the popular will.”5 Alexander
Bickel argues that “when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a
legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of
representatives of the actual people of the here and now.”6

See, e.g., Lars Vinx, The Incoherence of Strong Popular Sovereignty, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 101,
101 (2013) (criticizing the German Federal Constitutional Court for endorsing a conception of popular
sovereignty that requires the constitution to be a product of preexisting popular will).
4 Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 335 (1998).
5 Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1373, 1385 (1998).
6 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16–17 (2d ed. 1986).
3
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Elsewhere, I have described this as the “thwarting” complaint and
traced its history to Classical Athens, where it was first raised to resist an
attempt to prevent the Assembly from summarily executing some generals.7
Perhaps its most canonical American expression came in Lincoln’s First
Inaugural Address, which, implicitly referring to Dred Scott v. Sandford,
directly connects the judicial thwarting of electoral will to the failure of
popular sovereignty:
[I]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole
people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant
they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions the
people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically
resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal. 8

These canonical descriptions of the countermajoritarian problem rest on
the supposition that popular sovereignty consists in the people’s ability to
use the electoral process to control political outcomes, such that the exercise
of judicial power to frustrate that control undermines the democratic
legitimacy of the American government.
Major efforts to resolve the countermajoritarian problem have also
implicitly assumed the mechanical conception of popular sovereignty. For
example, John Hart Ely’s theory of representation-reinforcement judicial
review addresses the tension between constitutional judicial review and the
mechanical conception by positing that the appropriate function of judicial
review is to support the efficacy of democratic politics and hence the control
of the people over their political machinery, for example, by protecting their
rights to voting and free speech.9
Similarly, the theory of popular constitutionalism, associated with
scholars such as Larry Kramer, supposes that the people can also exercise
control over constitutional review and hence convert it from a hinderance of
their sovereign machinery to an exercise of it.10
Yet those efforts to reconcile constitutionalism with popular
sovereignty on a mechanical conception have not been wholly successful.
Both are vexed with a problem of fundamental indeterminacy, rooted in the
fact that the people can conceivably instantiate their will in multiple ways.
7 Paul Gowder, The Countermajoritarian Complaint, 23 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 10–
11 (2014).
8 First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln: Monday, Mar. 4, 1861, AVALON PROJ.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp [https://perma.cc/5NF3-XT5Q].
9 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980) (developing the general theory of representation-reinforcement).
10 See generally Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959
(2004) (reviewing popular constitutionalist literature).
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Thus, the democratic legitimacy of constitutional judicial decision-making
cannot be established by articulating an account of how those decisions
support democratic processes because the judicial outcomes that may
support democratic processes are underdetermined. For example, there are
genuine and serious arguments on both sides of the campaign finance debate
about the extent to which cases such as Buckley v. Valeo11 and Citizens
United v. FEC12 promote popular control over political outcomes (i.e., by
providing more opportunities for political speech) or undermine them (by
permitting the wealthy to dominate elections). The same point more
generally: any question of what legal rules best protect democratic processes
is itself a question that is potentially subject to democratic debate—debate
which representation reinforcement-style judicial review cuts off.13 For
another example, Americans deeply disagree about the appropriateness of
laws regulating voting, such as voter ID legislation, as well as the degree of
deference to be paid to states enacting such laws; these disagreements have
leaked into Supreme Court rulings in the form of decisions like Shelby
County v. Holder.14 The Supreme Court taking a position on those
disagreements cannot be justified simply by pointing to the necessity of
coming to some decision for democracy to move forward, for it is often
denied that the Court has come to the right decision or that it is its place to
make the decision at all.
Moreover, representation reinforcement theory cannot resolve the core
problem of generational difference: They the People of 1788 are not We the
People of 2019, and by what right do the 1788 people rule us today?15 This

11 424 U.S. 1, 19–23 (1976) (holding that political campaign expenditures are protected by the First
Amendment).
12 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010) (striking restrictions on independent campaign expenditures by
corporations and labor unions).
13 Even declining to decide such questions, as with the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision to duck the
question of partisan gerrymandering by resolving Gill v. Whitford on a standing issue, amounts to making
a decision—in that case, permitting one partisan group to (allegedly) cut off the effective access to the
democratic process of another. 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018). The same point applies to the Court’s 2019
decision to treat partisan gerrymandering as a nonjusticiable political question in Rucho v. Common
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019).
14 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down the formula for determining which states are subject to
Voting Rights Act preclearance under a theory of equal state sovereignty).
15 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 381 (1997) (“Why would one
think, presumptively, that Framers who lived two hundred years ago, inhabited a radically different world,
and possessed radically different ideas would have anything useful to say about how we should govern
ourselves today?”). That this has been a worry about the American Constitution since the Founding
generation is evidenced by a famous letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison of September 6,
1789. 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 27 MARCH 1789 TO 30 NOVEMBER 1789, at 392–98 (Julian
P. Boyd & William H. Gaines, Jr. eds., 1958) (arguing that constitution-makers have no right to bind
future generations); see also Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand:
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generational difference can undermine the basic structure of democratic selfrule. For example, the Electoral College and the malapportionment of the
Senate are controversial and were established in a very different society from
the one in which we live—we have no reason to believe that the social,
political, and economic concerns that might have animated the Framers in
creating them persist today. Yet they control how we make our democratic
decisions, including the democratic decision to keep or abandon those
institutions.
The theory of popular constitutionalism suffers from the inverse
problem. In order for the people to make decisions about what their law is,
they need to have some law in the first place. This is an ancient problem,
known to political theorists as the problem of constituent power: the identity
of a democratic people (its boundaries and the institutions through which it
forms and carries out its will) necessarily has to precede its democratic
acts—as a corporate entity, a demos cannot form a will or act until some legal
act has brought it into existence. But then how do we democratically
legitimate that first act?16 But the problem of constituent power is not merely
limited to the question of what legitimates the first act of lawmaking in a
democratic state; I submit that it also persists into its constitutional
operations. We cannot identify any particular popular act as a legitimate act
of constitutional interpretation without some preexisting body of
constitutional law which sets the criteria for such legitimacy, and which
cannot itself be interpreted by any such popular act on pain of circularity.
It seems to me that these difficulties, and the more general difficulty of
reconciling constitutional law and the mechanical conception of popular
sovereignty, highlight a tension in the heart of that conception. We cannot
imagine a democratic people without law, for law is what both constitutes a

Can the People Be Trusted?, 86 WASH U. L. REV. 313, 326 (2008) (quoting similar arguments from
Thomas Paine and Noah Webster) (citations omitted).
16 This is a problem that has vexed democratic theorists for a very long time. See CHRISTOPHER
MECKSTROTH, THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY: PARADOXES OF PROGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF
CHANGE 15–20 (2015) (providing a very helpful review of the recent literature); see also Bonnie Honig,
Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic Theory, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1, 5 (2007) (interpreting philosophy of Rousseau in context of a “paradox of politics” that there can be
no general will or popular perspective from which to issue the laws necessary to create that perspective).
For a concise (albeit skeptical) description of the problem of constituent power and its role in legal theory,
see David Dyzenhaus, Constitutionalism in an Old Key: Legality and Constituent Power, 1 GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM 229, 233–34 (2012). Incidentally, Dyzenhaus makes an argument quite congenial
to the articulation of the constitutional conception in Part II of this Article, defending the idea of a
Habermasian self-constituting rule of law as an alternative to classical ideas of constituent power, on the
condition that such a rule of law provides its people with “stake,” “independence,” and “part,” that is,
genuinely includes them in the demos. Id. at 255–56.

342

114:335 (2019)

Reconstituting We the People

demos and allows it to operate;17 at the same time, the mechanical conception
asks us to conceive of a demos unbounded by law, for legal constraints on
the demos thereby undermine its control over political outcomes.
However, arguing against these efforts to reconcile the mechanical
conception and constitutional law is not the mission of this Part. Instead, I
argue that the mechanical conception fails on its own terms. Accordingly,
we do not need to engage with the conventional arguments around the
countermajoritarian problem: those arguments start around a misconstrual of
what democracy is.18 I shall proceed to this argument immediately.
A. Digging Deeper into the Mechanical Conception
My description of the mechanical conception is not meant to identify
any particular scholar’s view. Instead, I claim that it is a latent set of
assumptions that seem to run underneath much of mainline democratic and
constitutional theory; in other words, it is a general characterization of a
category of views about popular sovereignty which has some popularity. As
I intend to argue against it, it is expected that this model of the conception
will have some intuitive grip on at least a substantial minority of readers
(otherwise, I may be in danger of confronting a straw-person).
This conception, as I interpret the broad presuppositions of American
democratic thought, is the premise that the way in which the people rule is
that they intentionally and reliably exercise causal power over the ordinary
political decisions of their states, typically through a kind of mechanical
control over those decisions via operating their political institutions. Put
differently, should a sufficient number of people choose to implement some
political outcome (lower taxes, the legalization of marijuana, the initiation
of a war), they have the power to bring that outcome into being via their
political institutions. For example, they may pass an initiative or referendum
to legalize marijuana, or they may elect representatives who share their views
on lower taxes.
Examples of the mechanical conception in democratic theory as
produced by political theorists abound. Consider Robert Dahl’s suggestion
that majority preferences are to be tracked “whenever policy alternatives are
perceived to exist,”19 or Philip Pettit’s supposition that a democracy must
allow citizens control over the discretionary decisions that the state takes in
17 See generally Paul Gowder, Response, The Rule of Law Against Sovereign Immunity in a
Democratic State, 93 TEX. L. REV. 246, 247, 250–52 (2015) (arguing that the rule of law is conceptually
prior to democratic self-rule).
18 I.e., because the mechanical conception fails, for reasons I shall describe, it cannot be a correct
account of democracy.
19 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 37 (Expanded ed. 2006).
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imposing rules on them.20 In both cases, the idea seems to be that the stuff of
popular authorship, and hence sovereignty, is mass control, via political
institutions, of day-to-day political outcomes.21
I am not the first to identify a latent mechanical conception in the
existing literature—the idea has sufficient popularity that some democratic
theorists have been at pains to deny that it exists. Recently, Andrew Sabl has
argued that empirical political scientists have frequently erred in supposing
that democratic theory properly understood includes some criterion of
“responsiveness” according to which legitimacy demands that citizens can
successfully bring about political outcomes in accordance with their
preferences.22 “Responsiveness” is essentially the same thing as the
mechanical conception; however, contra Sabl, many important contributions
to democratic theory (in addition to the examples cited in the previous
paragraph) implicitly include a responsiveness criterion similar to that
assumed by constitutional theorists.23 However, nothing in this Article rests

20 PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY
166 (2012).
21 By “political outcomes,” I mean, roughly, ordinary laws, policies, and other discrete exercises of
the state’s monopoly over violence. The mechanical conception need not be inconsistent with
representative government—you can have a version of the mechanical conception which supposes that
citizens operate representative machinery to control their political outcomes, for example, by electing
representatives who promise to repeal the prohibition on marijuana and unelecting them if they fail to do
so. Nor need the mechanical conception be inconsistent with a dialogic relationship between citizens and
representatives—it is possible to have a mechanical conception that supposes, for example, that it is
permissible for the citizens to vote for a marijuana legalization candidate, for that candidate to learn new
things about the implications of legalization once in office, and for that candidate to decline to repeal the
prohibition but manage to stay in office by convincing the voters that this was the right decision after all.
22 Andrew Sabl, The Two Cultures of Democratic Theory: Responsiveness, Democratic Quality, and
the Empirical-Normative Divide, 13 PERSP. ON POL. 345 (2015). Versions of this debate have been going
on for decades, and the pattern is familiar: some social scientist or cynical democratic theorist attempts
to debunk democratic theory, and less cynical democratic theorists respond by saying, in essence, “that’s
not what we were talking about.” See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982)
(arguing that problems of collective preference formation make the aspirations of democratic theory in
the tradition of Rousseau impossible to achieve); Carole Pateman, Social Choice or Democracy? A
Comment on Coleman and Ferejohn, 97 ETHICS 39 (1986) (arguing that social choice theorists such as
Riker have mischaracterized Rousseau’s democratic theory); Diana C. Mutz, Is Deliberative Democracy
a Falsifiable Theory?, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 521 (2008) (identifying empirical challenges for political
philosophers who claim that democratic deliberation is possible or socially beneficial); Dennis F.
Thompson, Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
497 (2008) (criticizing existing literature in deliberative democracy for inadequate engagement between
theoretical and empirical research).
23 Contra Sabl, supra note 22. Sabl observes that some deliberative democrats focus on the shaping
of preferences by deliberative institutions. Id. at 348. However, many deliberative democrats also tend to
suppose that those shaped preferences then exercise power over political outcomes via the operation of
political institutions. Deliberative democratic citizens are deliberating in order to come to a decision, and
doing so in order to make that decision, that is, to carry it out in the public sphere. See, for example, the
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on the contention that democratic theorists have fallen into the mechanical
conception—it is enough for my argument that constitutional theorists have
done so.
B. Why the Mechanical Conception Fails
Unfortunately, the mechanical conception is vexed by two distinct
problems making it difficult—perhaps impossibly so—to reliably satisfy. I
suggest that, for this reason, we ought to abandon the mechanical conception
wholly independent of its incompatibility with constitutional theory. That is,
it is a problem for American constitutional theory that judicial review does
not really seem to be compatible with the notion of the people exercising a
forward-looking and a backward-looking mechanical power over political
outcomes. We can resolve that problem either by abandoning judicial review
or by abandoning the mechanical conception of popular sovereignty. And I
suggest that the mechanical conception is so unrealistic—real states are so
unlikely to satisfy it—that we ought to just let it go and replace it with a
framework for democratic theory that puts the constitutional horse before the
democratic cart (the subject of Part II of this Article).
The first fatal problem for the mechanical conception is the problem of
corrupt origins. There is always a potential paradox associated with
democratic forms of organization, in view of the worry that the demos must
exist as a corporate entity before it can legitimate anything, including the
legal act bringing it into existence.24 However, even supposing that we can
terms in which Freeman describes deliberative democracy—as a decision-making procedure to actually
carry out mass political power. Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment,
29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 371, 372, 382 (2000) (describing deliberative democracy as a procedure to inform
citizens’ votes, in the context of democracy in general as a process of lawmaking). The kind of
deliberative democratic view advanced by James S. Fishkin et al., Deliberative Polling and Public
Consultation, 53 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 657 (2000), has actually been criticized by other democratic
theorists for recommending participatory institutions that fail to translate their recommendations into
political outcomes. See, e.g., Carole Pateman, Participatory Democracy Revisited, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 7,
9, 14 (2012) (“At worst, [citizen] juries are little more than focus groups, or they become useful
legitimating devices for an already-decided policy,” and that “[m]any other examples called ‘participatory
budgeting’ are merely consultative or provide information.”). The mechanical conception also often
creeps into democratic theory through accounts of representation, which suppose that the people have the
power to hold their representatives accountable for carrying out their political ends or influencing political
outcomes. See, e.g., Nadia Urbinati & Mark E. Warren, The Concept of Representation in Contemporary
Democratic Theory, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 387, 389, 395–96 (2008). Sometimes, the mechanical
conception enters democratic theory through the idea of “political equality,” which is often supposed to
mean that each citizen has an equal chance of determining political outcomes—this is why Jane
Mansbridge asserts that if a democracy cannot follow the will of a majority in cases of political conflict,
it “can no longer be said to have weighed the interests of all citizens equally.” Jane Mansbridge, Using
Power/Fighting Power, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 53, 53 (1994).
24 See MECKSTROTH, supra note 16, at 15–20 and accompanying text; see Honig, supra note 16, at
5.
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come up with an account of constituent power that avoids this paradox, the
unfortunate fact of the matter is that every real-world democracy has come
into being in ways that are unlikely to be legitimate even in principle.
Philosopher David Hume, of course, said this best in his essay Of the
Original Contract:
Almost all the governments which exist at present, or of which there remains
any record in story, have been founded originally either on usurpation or
conquest or both, without any presence of a fair consent or voluntary subjection
of the people.25

At their founding moments, the fundamental laws of democracies have
tended to be imposed by narrow parties, often composed of social elites,
rather than by genuine representatives of the political community as a whole.
Some of them have been imposed by foreign hegemons and colonial powers
or have come into being as a result of tainted compromises between a nascent
demos and its previous dictator.26 Even in those polities that have managed
to take effective control of their own fundamental laws, those processes have
still often been tainted by influence-peddling, meddling, and corruption.
Even if it is possible for a people, properly understood, to give itself its own
fundamental law, it is doubtful that it has ever happened.27

25 DAVID HUME, OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT (1748), reprinted in HUME’S MORAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 356, 360 (Henry D. Aiken ed., Hafner Press 1948).
26 See, e.g., Claudia Heiss, Legitimacy Crisis and the Constitutional Problem in Chile: A Legacy of
Authoritarianism, 24 CONSTELLATIONS 470 (2017) (arguing that Chile still suffers under a constitution
tainted by political necessities arising from the country’s transition out of authoritarianism); Douglas
Lemke & Jeff Carter, Birth Legacies, State Making, and War, 78 J. POL. 497 (2016) (describing methods
of origin of states and long-term consequences, including “derelict decolonization,” the abrupt departure
of a colonial power, leaving a nascent state without political institutions). On governments imposed by
foreign hegemons, even ostensibly democratic ones, U.S. state-building efforts in Iraq may serve as an
example.
27 One objection to this point might be that a people can be self-ruling even if its fundamental law
has been given by another, to the extent that lawgiving activity provides a foundation within which they
can exercise an authorial power. For example, I wrote this Article in a word-processing program. I did
not personally write the source code for the word processing program, but I am nonetheless the author of
the things I write with it. I do not need to be the author of the tools that I use to write in order to be the
author of the things I write. The same might be said for political outcomes. (I thank Mihailis Diamantis
for raising this point and for the word processor example.)
To this objection, I reply that the extent to which my lack of authorship (and hence control) over my
tools undermines my capacity to become the author of the things I make with the tools depends on the
extent to which the tools available to me constrain that which I may author with them. It happens to be
the case that word processors exercise a fairly light constraint on the things I can author with them—I can
write pretty much anything with them that is expressible in the languages I speak. Moreover, I have a
wide choice in word processors. The same is not obviously true for citizens who are born into an
entrenched constitution that limits their political outcomes, either in virtue of the way it structures their
democratic process (like the Electoral College) or the side constraints it imposes on it (like the Bill of
Rights). Rather than a word processor, the appropriate writing tool analogy for a very constraining
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Second is the broken machinery problem. It turns out to be almost
impossible for democratic publics to actually take control of day-to-day
political outcomes. This is true both for formal reasons and for empirical
reasons.
In the first category, consider that social choice theorists from Professor
Kenneth Arrow onward have shown that under many conditions, there is no
way to translate individual wills into a collective policy that consistently
reflects those wills.28 The literature contains a variety of ways to cope with
social choice problems, including sacrificing some of the fairly modest
Arrovian formal criteria, according to which it is supposed that individual
wills cause collective policies, or devising institutions which we imagine will
lead citizens to develop “single-peaked” preferences which can dodge the
dangers of social choice theory.29 However, it is fair to say that none have
been fully satisfactory and that social choice results continue to trouble all
attempts to causally attribute collective decisions to aggregate individual
wills in a coherent fashion.
In the second category, consider the burgeoning literature on citizens’
inabilities to competently form individual political wills or figure out what
kinds of action to take in order to translate those wills into outcomes. Some
scholars suggest that citizens of democratic states suffer from widespread
failures of means-end rationality. They are unable to make the actions their
state takes track the ends they aim to achieve because they lack skills, such
as understanding what policies will lead to what consequences, and even
what votes (e.g., for representatives) will lead to what policies.30 Others
constitution might be Orwell’s Newspeak, as a constrained language that undermines the agentic capacity
of its users.
28 E.g., CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILLIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS
OF CORPORATE AGENTS ch. 2 (2011). Broadly speaking, scholarship in this tradition has argued, starting
with Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, that there are formal mathematical inconsistencies among relatively
modest sets of desiderata for any method of aggregating the preferences of individuals into a collective
decision (like an election). See generally Christian List, Social Choice Theory, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2013), https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/win2013/entries/social-choice/#ArrThe [https://perma.cc/58NA-NUG5] (explaining Arrow’s
impossibility theorem).
29 See, e.g., John S. Dryzek & Christian List, Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A
Reconciliation, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1, 14–18 (2003) (arguing that deliberation narrows the scope of
democratic decisions in a fashion conducive, for mathematical reasons, to the coherence of those
decisions).
30 Perhaps the most over-the-top example: Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels offer some evidence
in support of the claim that shark attacks caused meaningful damage to Woodrow Wilson’s share of the
1916 New Jersey vote and argue that this is not because, e.g., voters were dissatisfied with Wilson’s
response to the attacks, but simply because they were lashing out at the nearest available target to retaliate
for their suffering. CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY
ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 120–28 (2016). This result has lately been
subject to some controversy. Anthony Fowler & Andrew B. Hall, Do Shark Attacks Influence Presidential
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identify similarly ineffective political behavior but characterize it as a
success of means-end rationality because aggregate decision-making is
characterized by “rational ignorance”: the more people involved in a
decision, the less incentive any individual person has to take the trouble to
decide well—or even to decide at all, at which point rational ignorance
becomes rational apathy.31 Again, there has been an important countertrend
in various theories of what might be called, following Professor Josiah Ober,
“democratic knowledge,”32 but it is as yet far from clear that democratic
knowledge can triumph over the skeptics.33
Such an undifferentiated record of practical failure gives us reason to
believe that success is beyond our reach. At the very least, the mechanical
conception seems unlikely to give us much reason for hope about democracy
in the real world. This might not be a reason to reject the mechanical
conception. Perhaps democracy is just some impossible dream, although for
methodological reasons which I have discussed elsewhere, I think we ought
to look for a conception of democracy that can do something to help us
understand the virtues, however imperfect, of actual states for which we have
used the label.34 At any rate, the impossibility of satisfying the mechanical
conception certainly gives us some reason to turn to the alternatives, which
I shall do immediately.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTION
In this Part, I will sketch an alternative to the mechanical conception. I
will call it the “constitutional conception,” and it represents a generalization
of the kind of theory of popular sovereignty described inter alios by
Elections? Reassessing a Prominent Finding on Voter Competence, 80 J. POL. 1423 (2018) (critiquing
Achen and Bartels as described).
31 See, e.g., JASON BRENNAN, AGAINST DEMOCRACY (2016) (arguing that democracy is morally
objectionable, in part because of rational ignorance); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL
IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013) (similar). Just for context, one recent
estimate of the average voter’s chance of determining a U.S. presidential election was one in sixty million.
Andrew Gelman et al., What Is the Probability Your Vote Will Make a Difference?, 50 ECON. INQUIRY
321, 323–24 (2012).
32 See generally JOSIAH OBER, DEMOCRACY AND KNOWLEDGE: INNOVATION AND LEARNING IN
CLASSICAL ATHENS (2008) (analyzing Ancient Athenian political structure as a set of effective
democratic knowledge-aggregation institutions); HÉLÈNE LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC REASON:
POLITICS, COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE RULE OF THE MANY (2013) (arguing that “wisdom of
crowds” enables democracies to make good decisions notwithstanding cognitive/knowledge failures of
individual citizens).
33 See generally Samuel Bagg, The Power of the Multitude: Answering Epistemic Challenges to
Democracy, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 891, 892–94 (2018) (describing the current state of the debate).
34 Paul Gowder, Institutional Values, or How to Say What Democracy Is, 30 SW. PHIL. REV. 235,
240–41 (2014) (arguing that “democracy” requires appeal to real-world observations of states to
characterize its conceptual structure).
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constitutional theorists Jürgen Habermas,35 Bruce Ackerman,36 Seyla
Benhabib,37 Frank Michelman,38 Robert Post,39 and Reva Siegel.40 This set of
related theories draws elements from civic republicanism, from the
presumptive ambitions of constitutional founders, from the experiences of
citizens in constitutional republics, and from ambitious claims about the
identity of popular agents extending over time. On such theories, the
mechanical conception of popular sovereignty is made, at least partly, to run
in reverse, insofar as at least some political outcomes lead the popular willformation that legitimates them.
The constitutional conception is, at heart, an account of Us the People
according to which 1788 Americans and 2019 Americans represent a
continuous demos with an ongoing political identity. Professor Ackerman,
for example, supposes that the generations are in conversation with one
another through moments of constitutional authorship.41 Professor Habermas
supposes that the generations represent a continuous process of learning and
discursive legitimation through democratic institutions.42 These theories
ostensibly allow us to understand popular sovereignty as dynamic, not static,
and understand ourselves as co-authors with prior generations of the
Constitution.
These ideas have been most helpfully developed in the course of a series
of conversations from the late 1990s and early 2000s about civic
republicanism, Professor Habermas’s discourse theory, and, most
interestingly, a collection of ideas known as “constitutional patriotism.” I
will describe the core of these conversations between Professors Habermas,
Michelman, and Ackerman in a few paragraphs.

35

See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican
Versions, 7 RATIO JURIS. 1 (1994).
36 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
37 See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM (Robert Post ed., 2006).
38 See, e.g., FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (1999); Frank I. Michelman,
Constitutional Authorship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 64 (Larry Alexander
ed., 1998); Frank I. Michelman, Morality, Identity, and ‘Constitutional Patriotism’, 14 RATIO JURIS. 253
(2001).
39 See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
40 Id.
41 Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1519–20 (1997)
(describing role of generations in constitutional meaning-formation).
42 Jürgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?,
29 POL. THEORY 766, 774–75 (2001) (responding to the problem of constituent power by understanding
a constitution as “a tradition-building project with a clearly marked beginning in time” that constitutes a
“learning process” based, in turn, on the “shared practice” of making something out of their constitution).
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Constitutional patriotism, as described by Professor Jan-Werner
Müller, is as a political ambition rooted in a postwar Germany where the
constitution had originally been “imposed from the outside” but grew to
become “the most respected public institution of the country.”43 On Professor
Müller’s account, it became the basis for a theory of patriotism that could be
acceptable to German intellectuals, such as Professor Habermas, who were
obliged by the history of National Socialism to reject any kind of ethnonational identification for the German people, while still retaining enough of
a collective identity to take responsibility for the crimes of that history.44
Constitutional patriotism is a kind of multi-headed beast. As Professor
Müller recounted, it is a theory of post-nationalist civic attachment,
especially in the German context, and it has been put to service in debates
about the European Union and the possibility of transnational attachment.45
However, it has also served as a theory of popular sovereignty, particularly
when it has been transposed to the American literature.46
As theory of popular sovereignty, constitutional patriotism can be seen
as a partial answer to one of its fundamental problems, to wit: popular
sovereignty appears to be necessarily paradoxical. Professor Bonnie Honig
explains this problem in terms of Rousseau, suggesting that democratic
legitimacy cannot proceed from a “people” with a “general will” at all. This
is because the “people” as currently constituted can never fully satisfy the
normative demands of democratic theory, such as an appropriate orientation
toward the common good.47 More abstractly, it appears in the form of an
answer to the question that the problem of constituent power poses: How can
43 JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM 21 (2007). Professor David Law gives an
account of Japan’s constitution that not only problematizes the notion of an imposed constitution but
might serve as a key empirical illustration of some key prerequisites of real-world constitutional
patriotism: a constitution imposed by military victory on political elites, but adapted through democratic
and legal processes to fit the people as well as commanding wide mass support. David S. Law, The Myth
of the Imposed Constitution, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 239 (Denis J.
Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013).
44 Id. It is striking to compare this history to that of the United States. The Reconstruction
Amendments were also imposed on the South by a military victor, but the South never developed a kind
of constitutional patriotism, I submit, because it was never forced to reject the ethnic nationalism on
which its antebellum law was founded. Hence, Jim Crow.
45 See, e.g., Justine Lacroix, For a European Constitutional Patriotism, 50 POL. STUDS. 944 (2002)
(arguing that constitutional patriotism has the resources to answer nationalist objections to European
integration).
46 I’m also playing a little bit fast and loose with boundaries of different theoretical categories here.
The conversation between Professors Habermas and Michelman, on which I primarily draw, also
sometimes gets expressed in terms of republicanism and other such categories; only part of Professor
Habermas’s general discourse-theoretic theory of legal legitimation would properly be labelled
“constitutional patriotism.” However, for terminological convenience, I’m running it all together under
the single label.
47 Honig, supra note 16, at 122–23.
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a demos democratically legitimate the act of constitution-making which
makes the demos itself?
“Retroactively,” the constitutional patriot replies. The essence of the
idea is that we can understand citizens and constitutional founders as coauthors of the constitutional foundations of their government to the extent
that they are attached to those foundations in the right way and participate in
the development of the universalistic (as opposed to particularistic,
nationalistic) values underlying those foundations.48 Because the alreadyconstituted current generation of the demos participates in the act of
constitution-making with the founding generation, the institutional capacity
of today’s people to generate legitimate decisions can, via that crossgenerational shared enterprise, legitimate the founding acts as well.
Professor Ackerman’s theory is perhaps the most explicitly crossgenerational version of what I am calling the constitutional conception. As
previously mentioned, Ackerman imagines American constitutionalism as
an intergenerational conversation among a people with a continuous political
identity.49 If we accept this notion, it seems to move us toward rejecting at
least some objections to the American Constitution based on generational
difference. It’s not that some dead people are ruling us, the people of today,
via some entrenched law and countermajoritarian courts; rather, We the
cross-generational People are continuously ruling ourselves, using the
countermajoritarian courts to manipulate both the temporal reach and the
fixity of our decisions.50
Yet, for reasons expressed most clearly by Professor Frank Michelman,
Professor Ackerman’s theory of cross-generational legitimacy requires a
48 I draw this description largely from Professor Honig’s interpretation (and critique) of the idea.
Bonnie Honig, Dead Rights, Live Futures: A Reply to Habermas’s “Constitutional Democracy”, 29 POL.
THEORY 792–805 (2001).
49 See ACKERMAN, supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also Ackerman, supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
50 Note, however, that this cannot resolve all versions of the countermajoritarian objection to judicial
review. It resolves versions of the objection where the problem arises from the fact that the democratic
will of the people today is thwarted by unelected judges applying entrenched law which is itself not
legitimated by that same democratic will—an objection which it resolves by declaring that the law being
applied is indeed itself legitimated by the same democratic will, as today’s majority and the constitutional
framers are taken to represent the same underlying democratic agent. But it does not necessarily resolve
objections, such as Professor Waldron’s, which focus on the point that the people may disagree about
what a constitution means and that resolution of that decision by judges, rather than majorities, is itself
undemocratic, even if the constitution itself is democratically legitimate. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of
the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1393–94 (2006). However, it does make the
problem Professor Waldron raises somewhat less daunting, since we might be able to imagine more-orless popular constitutionalist techniques to incorporate majority views into the process of judicial review,
and the argument of this Article suggests that those techniques can be legitimate in virtue of the
Constitution’s own legitimacy.
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fundamental core of commitment to shared cross-generational values.51 The
worry (perhaps Professor Michelman’s, definitely mine) is that for a
continuous political identity to make sense across generations with very
different circumstances and perhaps even different short-term goals and
basic presuppositions of political life, some form of shared intergenerational
agency must be found, in terms of some shared goals. That is, suppose I ask
the question, “Why should what Hamilton and Madison and the people who
lived at that time thought about political organization bear at all on how we
organize our lives today?” The answer, “Because we’re participating in a
shared enterprise with them,” seems implausible unless we can point to some
shared high-level goals, and some point to the enterprise beyond just the
coincidental fact that we happen to occupy the same geographic territory and
happen to have started off living under their rules.52
It is this shared identity in terms of political right as expressed in
constitutional ideals that Professor Habermas’s version of constitutional
patriotism is supposed to provide. As I read Habermas’s argument, a
democratic constitution and the historical practices that have fleshed it out
supply a normative foundation that can connect past and future generations.53
Every generation has shaped the practices which fill out a country’s
constitutional outline; when we interpret that constitution we also interpret
those practices and that history. It is this practice of joint interpretation in
terms of a continuous set of ideas that themselves putatively represent some
kind of distinctive value and identity claims (we’re the kind of people who
value “free speech” a lot more than other democratic societies, for example)
which licenses us to attribute a shared scheme of value, and hence a shared
identity, to We the People across generations.54

51

Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, supra note 38, at 76–81.
It seems to me that the notion of a shared value underneath constitutional institutions is a core
feature of liberal constitutional democracies. Humans tend to want some reason beyond strategic
expedience for attachment to their states. In view of the liberal character of the states with whose
justification we are concerned, grounds of attachment like ethno-national or religious identity are ruled
out on principle. But the people of a liberal democracy attribute an overall constitutional goal to their
states and become attached to it in virtue of the worthiness of that goal. Thus, as Professor Moses Finley
famously observed, people in constitutional societies across history have tended to create valorizing
mythologies around their constitutions. M.I. FINLEY, THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY 34–59 (1975).
And I will argue in Part III that we can see similar attachment in the history of Black American
constitutional thought.
53 See Habermas, supra note 42, at 774–75.
54 This assumes that members of these generations are appealing to their constitution as a thing they
actually more-or-less endorse, as opposed to simply some unfortunate package of legal rules that, for
example, because of collective action problems, they’re stuck with. But people in constitutional societies
generally seem to talk as if they do so endorse it. See generally FINLEY, supra note 52. Incidentally, the
reader may already see the problems with these ideas in terms of excluded members of the community
52

352

114:335 (2019)

Reconstituting We the People

However, Professor Michelman has worries about that move as well.55
He convincingly argues that from the standpoint of constitutional patriotism,
we must give some account of how citizens are to deal with the fact that they
will often disagree as to what their constitutional institutions amount to.
Moreover, the constitutional patriot is obliged to give an account of how
citizens can accept those institutions in an incompletely theorized form, in
the face of concrete interpretations of the underlying institutional values that
might fill them out even in a way that violates their most fundamental
individual values.
For an example of that problem, we might think of the American
constitutional debate over abortion and the way that it highlights a stubborn
difference between a fundamental value of bodily autonomy for some and a
deep religious commitment for others. Can we really say that all of us in the
United States, across generations, are members of the same people in virtue
of our shared constitutional acceptance and adherence to an ongoing project
of fulfilling and filling out the value claims underneath it, if some of us think
that the Constitution guarantees abortion in order to protect women’s bodily
integrity and autonomy, while others of us think that such a position is
tantamount to infanticide?
Professor Michelman’s tentative and reluctant solution to this problem
on behalf of the constitutional patriot is to posit a kind of partial agreement
and good faith on a baseline liberal-democratic commitment shared by all
that allows a people to at least recognize that they’re playing the same game
and accept the same abstract values, even in the face of deep disagreement
about the concrete instantiations of those values. In short, the pro-lifers and
the pro-choicers have to agree about enough to be able to think that one
another are making mistakes about interpreting shared values. Pro-lifers and
pro-choicers must not think that the former are actually into enslaving
women and the latter are actually into infanticide, at least not under that
description. They must merely think that one another are simply mistaken
about the policies that their shared acceptance of women’s right to bodily
autonomy and rejection of infanticide collectively amount to.
It is worth quoting Professor Michelman at length here:
“Constitutional patriotism,” it appears, is the morally necessitated readiness of
a country’s people to accept disagreement over the application of core
constitutional principles of respect for everyone as free and equal, without loss
of confidence in the univocal content of the principles, because and as long as
they can understand the disagreement as strictly tied to struggles over
who have not had a chance to participate in this joint interpretation and may not endorse the constitution—
this will dominate my attention below.
55 Michelman, Morality, Identity, and ‘Constitutional Patriotism’, supra note 38, at 267–69.
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constitutional identity. And what explains that readiness, when and where it is
found? The answer to that must be that conditions then and there warrant a level
of confidence that the struggle over corporate identity occurs within a corporate
identity that is already incompletely, but to a sufficient degree, known and
fixed. The answer is, in other words, a cultural contingency—the cultural
contingency, when and where it exists, that the corporate identity in question,
however contested it may be in other respects, is already perceived by all
concerned to fall within the class of morally conscientious (hence, in a
Habermasian view, democratic-proceduralist) constitutional identities.56

In other words, Professor Michelman suggests that a kind of civic unity
is necessary for constitutional patriotism to serve as a case for democratic
legitimation. We can understand the constitutional conception as, at bottom,
directed at giving an account of the preconditions and democratic
implications of such civic unity.
A. A Model of the Constitutional Conception
I will now sketch a model of a constitutional conception. It captures
something like the endpoint of this Ackerman–Habermas–Michelman
conversation with some of the particularities of discourse theory stripped out.
However, the following merely represents my synthesis of the conception,
not anyone else’s argument in particular. I contend that popular sovereignty
on the following model could work to reconcile a democracy to a constitution
like ours (but, for reasons described below, not identical to it).
On the constitutional model, constitutional legitimation via popular
sovereignty—and democratic legitimation of the political outcomes
generated by such a constitution—should be understood as a process rather
than an event. The model contains the following features:
institutionalization, endorsement from those governed under those
institutions, collective political action, learning or “development,” and a
shared cross-generational corporate identity. I elaborate upon those features
below:
First is institutionalization: First-order democratic legitimacy is a
property of fundamental political institutions (i.e., the organization of power,
the system of basic rights), not day-to-day political outcomes, although those
institutions in turn legitimate the day-to-day outcomes. Those institutions are

56 Id. at 269. In order to achieve this level of baseline unity, Professor Habermas’s version of
constitutional patriotism helps itself to a bunch of claims about basic human rights drawn from his broader
discourse theory of political legitimation. Habermas, supra note 42, at 776–79. As I understand it, those
rights set forth the ground rules that all players in the liberal-democratic game have to accept, even to
(Professor Michelman would argue) get into a position by which they can start to take seriously the notion
that they accept the same constitution which sets forth that society’s interpretation of those ground rules.
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typically organized, via codification or tradition, into a system of values and
institutions suitable to become broadly known and understood through the
population. We can describe those organized institutions as a “constitution”
and recognize that a constitution in this sense need not be a written document
of fundamental law such as the U.S. Constitution or the German Basic Law,
but can also encompass both unwritten fundamental legal institutions, as in
Britain, and written documents expressing fundamental values that do not
purport to legislate, such as the U.S. Declaration of Independence.57
Second, those governed under those institutions generally come to
endorse that constitution in a nonpathological way, for example, as a result
of learning, socialization, and experience with a shared practice of collective
problem-solving under it (and not, for example, simply as a result of
propaganda or state terror). They may endorse their constitution in the
abstract, i.e., even if they disagree as to what their abstract values and
institutions amount to, or disagree with the way in which the expressed
values have been filled out in some cases. Such endorsement is not
inconsistent with deeply divided parties, each claiming to be defending their
true shared constitutional values.
Third, over their history, the people at large take an active role in
shaping their constitutional institutions through collective political action.
They organize both within and without the structure of formally sanctioned
political activity to advocate for interpretations of the values underlying their
constitutions that those organizing happen to hold. Moreover, if those values
are threatened, for example, by antidemocratic forces, they engage in
collective action to defend them. They enjoy a broad baseline of liberaldemocratic participatory rights, such as free speech and the electoral
franchise, which facilitate their collective action.
Fourth is learning—or, perhaps, “development”: Over time, these
processes of collective action, plus the functioning of constitutional
institutions, allow those institutions to adapt to accord with citizens’
collective learning about those institutions’ implications in terms of their
values. This may happen either explicitly, such as by constitutional
amendment, or implicitly, by changes in the set of interpretations of those
values and institutions that citizens are willing to defend or landmark
legislation. Collective action, in short, works, and it produces results that
citizens tend to endorse as increasingly right over time.
57 Even where there is some constitutional text, it is not a conclusive source for a state’s constitutional
values. Rather, those values should be understood as a product of interpretation, in a broadly Dworkinian
sense, in which we can read the state’s system of political organization, its broad pattern of political
outcomes, and its constitutional text (if any) together as capturing something like the values and
aspirations of some constructive agent trying to pursue some vision of political life.
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Finally, these processes of endorsement, learning, and collective action
promote the development of a shared corporate identity—a We the People—
whose members understand themselves to have that corporate identity across
generations. That corporate identity is in part understood as encompassing
the distinctive constitutional institutions of their state and the values that it
serves and expresses.
B. How the Constitutional Conception Solves the Deficiencies of the
Mechanical Conception
The constitutional conception allows those in democratic states, under
plausible real-world circumstances, to understand themselves as part of a
collective agent that has authored their constitution as well as day-to-day
political outcomes brought about under it. It does so by redefining the object
of authorship and the way it is achieved.
It will be helpful to consider the two problems in terms of two different
demands of authorship. We the People must be able to understand ourselves
both as the authors of our fundamental law and of our day-to-day political
outcomes.
Under the constitutional conception, the people are the authors of their
fundamental law for essentially the reasons given by Professors Ackerman
and Habermas, as elucidated and modified by Professor Michelman. That is,
the generations are coparticipants in a common enterprise of authorship
rooted in a shared scheme of value. The founding generation (or a foreign
hegemon, or whoever) wrote the constitution in question, it is true, but
intervening generations have (a) developed its interpretation through their
political acts within and without formal institutions (legislation, litigation,
action in the streets) and (b) come to learn over time that their constitution is
both useful (it helps them live together as a political community) and
valuable (it instantiates values that they endorse).58 Over time, the people
thus make the constitution their own.
Incidentally, this is a conception of how a constitution might grow into
acceptance that is much older than Professor Habermas. As Aristotle (or
perhaps one of his students; the attribution of this document is contested)
suggests in Constitution of Athens, Solon gave the laws to Athens, then
promptly left town for a decade, ordering them not to change anything in the

58 This is not to say that such claims are true for every constitutional society—it’s possible for people
not to endorse their constitution in these ways, or for them to come to do so purely as a matter of false
consciousness or ideology rather than learning and benign socialization. This Section is a possibility
claim—that we can realistically have states that satisfy the demands of popular sovereignty for these
reasons—not an actuality claim.
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meantime.59 It seems to me that what Solon was trying to do (really or
mythically) was to give the Athenian people an opportunity to operate his
laws, flesh them out with their own day-to-day choices, and come to
understand their virtues—and in doing so, make them their own. If Plato in
Crito is to be believed, this worked: as I have discussed elsewhere, the laws
could be identified with the city itself and could serve as partly constitutive
even of Socrates’s own identity as an Athenian.60 In short, the constitution
authors the demos, and the demos, thus constituted, authors the constitution.61
What of day-to-day outcomes? We ought to distinguish two categories
of ways in which citizen wills over day-to-day outcomes might be frustrated
in such a state, in order to see whether those frustrations are nonetheless
consistent with popular sovereignty under the constitutional conception.
First are what we might call intentional frustrations. Our Constitution,
as we’ve worked it out, allows nine people in black robes to decide that We
the People do not get to, among other things, prohibit contraception,62 require
private citizens to purchase health insurance,63 confer on the President the
power to strike individual line items from the federal budget,64 define
marriage as between a man and a woman,65 or undertake, in our public
colleges, affirmative action for the sake of reparations, racial justice, or any
purpose other than “diversity,”66 understood as the capacity of students of
color to improve the educational outcomes of white students and economic
and military outcomes for white-dominated institutions after graduation, as

59 Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED
OXFORD TRANSLATION 2341, 2346 para. 11 (Jonathan Barnes ed., F.G. Kenyon trans., 1984).
60 Paul Gowder, What the Laws Demand of Socrates—and of Us, 98 MONIST 360, 366–67 (2015)
(interpreting the argument of the Laws in Plato’s Crito for why Socrates should not abscond from his
sentence as appealing to the role of the laws of Athens both in individual identity-formation for citizens
and in the collective maintenance of democratic life).
61 I thank Mihailis Diamantis for suggesting the parallel construction here. To be clear, the
constitution authors the demos by laying the foundational scheme of political value out of which its
collective identity is composed as well as the minimum institutions necessary to sustain its identity as a
People capable of constitutional authorship, such as basic inclusive human rights and participatory
capacities. In Solon’s case, the Athenian people already existed, and the original myth of its identity was
probably not constitutional—the Athenians were said to have sprung from their native soil. See generally
Vincent J. Rosivach, Autochthony and the Athenians, 37 CLASSICAL Q. 294 (1987). But the reading I give
of Crito suggests that Solon’s laws can be said to have reconstituted Athenian political identity on a legal
basis. Gowder, supra note 60, at 366–67.
62 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
63 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
64 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
65 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
66 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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explained by Professor Derrick Bell’s theory of interest convergence.67 The
Electoral College, as we’ve worked it out via our state legislatures, requires
states to give their electoral votes to the winner of the popular vote in their
states and hence provides disproportionate power to elect presidents to rural
voters and raises the repeated specter of presidents whose personalities and
policies are rejected by the majority of the electorate.
To these complaints, the constitutional conception responds that the key
words in the previous paragraph are “as we’ve worked it out.” We did not
have to read our Constitution to provide the power of judicial review; we do
not have to continue to read it that way or to continue to allow the Supreme
Court to impose these frustrations. Recall that we almost put a stop to it
during the New Deal.68 Likewise, the way the Electoral College has been
structured is an active matter of continuing politics—there are social
movement efforts, like the campaign for a national popular vote compact,
aimed at re-understanding the practical implementation of the Electoral
College as written into the Constitution.69 They might eventually win—or, in
terms of the constitutional conception, our generation as well as future
generations might contribute to the continuing development of our
Constitution, and that way make it our/their own. But win or lose, it is that
same We the People continuing across time that has developed judicial
review and the Electoral College over that time; we can rationally understand
the consequences of those restraints as frustrations that we have imposed on
ourselves—perhaps as instances of the self-binding considered by Professor
Jon Elster70—and thus understand ourselves as the authors of the outcomes
of those frustrations.
The constitutional conception also requires a response to recalcitrant
political outcomes that seem to be imposed by rogue institutions, such as a

67 Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624–25 (2003) (pointing out
that the compelling interest in educational diversity used to authorize affirmative action in state
universities in Grutter attends not to the interests of subordinated minorities but to the interests of schools,
employers, and the military).
68 See generally Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM.
HIST. REV. 1052, 1055 (2005) (describing debate among historians over the extent to which political
pressure forced the Court to cease obstructing the New Deal).
69 The idea of the popular vote compact is that since states get to choose how to allocate their electoral
votes, a group of states controlling a majority of the electoral college can enter into an interstate compact
according to which each will allocate their votes to the winner of the national popular vote—and hence
implement the popular election of the president without constitutional amendment. See generally Susan
Haigh, Connecticut Lawmakers Vote to Join Popular Vote Pact, AP NEWS (May 6, 2018),
https://apnews.com/64aa4481f15c4ceb926f609f02715c8d [https://perma.cc/2BCR-6X8W].
70 Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities
of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1754, 1758–60 (2003) (defining precommitment and raising
questions about the extent to which constitution-making can be seen as an example of the phenomenon).
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Supreme Court that has positioned itself as a retrograde force standing in the
way of a clear and extended popular will to the contrary, even on issues that
might seem to be of fundamental constitutional value, and in ways that do
not seem to be amenable to resolution by ordinary politics. Let us not forget
that Lincoln’s resort to the thwarting complaint was in response to the evil
of Dred Scott.71 Let us call those “unintentional frustrations,” frustrations of
popular control over political outcomes that we can’t plausibly attribute to
inconsistencies in the will of a demos extending across time. (The line
between intentional and unintentional frustrations may not be all that firm.)
Here, too, the constitutional conception has such an answer, represented
most saliently by Professor Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments:
where frustrations mount too high, the people have a reserve capacity to
overcome the difficulties of their democratic machinery and impose their
will on their institutions. The difficulty of doing so, and the requirement of
genuine mass alignment and mobilization to do so, establish a kind of
constitutional credibility for these moments.72 Thus, while institutions that
are built to frustrate short-term electoral results or popular desires might
occasionally go rogue, even for an extended period of time, citizens of states
that feature this kind of reserve capacity in the people can nonetheless retain
confidence in their ultimate ability to command authorship in the long run.73

71

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 461–62 (1989)
(describing the “specially onerous higher lawmaking system” achievable by mass movement politics
capable of generating constitutional legitimacy as act of the demos (emphasis omitted)).
73 A similar point may be applied to unintentional frustrations more broadly. Rational ignorance, for
example—the (alleged) fact that citizens of large and modern democracies lack incentive to learn how to
operate their political machinery—isn’t something that we could plausibly attribute to an act of ongoing
authorship of We the People. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. However, even if citizens are
unavoidably incapable of achieving some end through their democratic processes in one instance, they
can still understand themselves as authors of the overall complex of outcomes that includes the frustrating
outcome and the sociopolitical factors that lead to it. (For example, one might argue that our rational
ignorance is a product of our large constituencies that lead to a minuscule likelihood of individual votes
making a difference, plus our governmental, economic, and policy complexity; our large constituencies
and our complexity are probably a product of our astounding wealth and governmental capacity; they are
the price we pay for the other victories we have achieved as a People.) Moreover, they can still understand
themselves as having the capacity over time to revise that outcome, or to shape the rest of their outcomes
to accommodate it and incorporate it into the larger scheme of goals that they attribute to their demos. Or
they may understand themselves as having a second-order capacity to develop their own first-order ability
to collectively influence political outcomes, for example, by intervening on the educational system and
the structure of political decision-making.
To be fair, my responses to both intentional and unintentional frustrations still impose some
mechanistic political efficacy constraints on democratic systems. Social movements have to work
sometimes, even ordinary political machinery still has to work sometimes—or else the claim that a state’s
institutions are under continual reexamination and redevelopment is false, and the claim that the people
have the capacity to correct recalcitrant outcomes with constitutional moments is false. However, the
72
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The constitutional conception understands a state’s institutions as a
combination of its day-to-day outcomes in the aggregate, over time, as those
outcomes flesh out the values and more fundamental and abstract institutions
that make up the state’s constitution; that complex of outcomes and values
is under continual reexamination and redevelopment across generations.
Popular authorship of the Constitution, and the laws enacted under it, is a
process, not a result. And this process can include judicial review.
C. Black Exclusion and the Failure of the Constitutional Conception
However, the constitutional conception cannot legitimate states where
some class of people is persistently and illegitimately excluded.74 By
“excluded” I mean to capture, but not limit the analysis to, the experience of
Black Americans across the centuries.75 In this Section, I argue that Black
Americans have been persistently excluded from the demos and that this
exclusion is fatal to the legitimating ambitions of the constitutional
conception. In the next Part, I articulate a theory, drawing from a tradition of
Black American constitutional thought, that may provisionally redeem the
constitutional conception and, with it, the American Constitution.
1. The Persistent Exclusion of Black Americans
American constitutional history is a history of democratic exclusions—
the Native American, the Woman, and of course the Slave. Indeed, scholars
have argued that We the People is constructed in opposition to such
categories. In the words of Professor Nikhil Singh, “the ideal national subject
has actually been a highly specific person whose universality has been
fashioned from a succession of those who have designated his antithesis,

constitutional conception is consistent with a lot less popular outcome-directing capacity than is the
mechanical conception.
74 To be sure, the question of who gets to be part of the demos that is the subject of popular
sovereignty is always highly contested. See, e.g., Sarah Song, The Boundary Problem in Democratic
Theory: Why the Demos Should Be Bounded by the State, 4 INT’L THEORY 39 (2012) (giving one account
of whom should be included and whom excluded). Sometimes, it’s perfectly acceptable to exclude
individuals or groups from the demos—Vladimir Putin, for example, is not entitled to vote for the U.S.
President—denying him a vote doesn’t make the United States less democratic, for Putin is not part of
the demos. But there are difficult boundary cases—how much, for example, should lawfully resident
aliens be included in the American demos? Yet we do not need an overall theory of who is appropriately
entitled to be part of the People to identify some cases where a country obviously gets it wrong. While
there might be difficult boundary cases, there are easy cases as well, and real-world states have routinely
blown the easy cases, by, for example, enslaving people, disenfranchising racial and religious minorities
as well as women, and so on.
75 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 13 (2000) (defining exclusion as
“political processes that claim to be democratic but which some people reasonably claim are dominated
by only some of those whose interests are affected by them”).

360

114:335 (2019)

Reconstituting We the People

those irreducibly non-national subjects who appeared in the different guises
of slave, Indian, and, at times, immigrant.”76
As Professor Singh also argues, the condition of Black Americans
stands apart even within the collection of exclusions that have made up
America, for Black Americans represent “the anomaly of an exclusion that
was at once foundational to and located within the polity.”77 Put bluntly, how
can We the People include Black Americans when the Constitution of 1788
was written against a background conception of the demos in which Black
meant not People but property?78 Moreover, important parts of the
Constitution of 1788 were written in order to preserve the capacity of
slaveholding states to continue to exclude Black Americans from the
polity—the most blatant, of course, being the three-fifths “compromise”
(between slaveholding Whites and non-slaveholding Whites), according to
which those who held Black Americans as slaves could vote for three-fifths
of them in Congress.
The Constitution of 1870 at least purported to offer formal equality to
Black Americans. Many Black Americans could hold an authorship role in
the constitutional reforms of the Reconstruction period due to the brief
flowering of black suffrage, as well as the prior service of thousands of Black
Americans in the Union Army that forced those reforms upon the South.79
76 NIKHIL PAL SINGH, BLACK IS A COUNTRY: RACE AND THE UNFINISHED STRUGGLE FOR
DEMOCRACY 21 (2004). The same idea in terms of individual psychology can be found in the work of
Ralph Ellison. See Jack Turner, Awakening to Race: Ralph Ellison and Democratic Individuality, 36 POL.
THEORY 655, 664–68 (2008) (reading Ellison in terms of existentialism, in the suggestion that white
identification and white supremacy are coping mechanisms for white people to deal with the uncertainty
of the world around them and their own identities). In Ellison’s words, as quoted by Turner:

Since the beginning of the nation, white Americans have suffered from a deep inner uncertainty
as to who they really are. One of the ways that has been used to simplify the answer has been to
seize upon the presence of black Americans and use them as a marker, a symbol of limits, a
metaphor for the “outsider.” Many whites could look at the social position of blacks and feel that
color formed an easy and reliable gauge for determining to what extent one was or was not
American.
Id. at 666 (quoting Ralph Ellison, What America Would Be Like Without Blacks, TIME, Apr. 6, 1970, at
54, 55).
77 SINGH, supra note 76, at 22.
78 As we shall see, this grim vision of the Constitution has been contested by many Black Americans.
See infra Part III.
79 One hundred eighty thousand Black Americans served in the Union Army. Eric Foner, Rights and
the Constitution in Black Life During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 74 J. AM. HIST. 863, 864 (1987).
On the authorial capacity exercised by Black Americans in the brief period of suffrage, see generally
Michael D. Cobb & Jeffrey A. Jenkins, Race and the Representation of Blacks’ Interests During
Reconstruction, 54 POL. RES. Q. 181 (2001) (describing election of Black members of Congress following
Black suffrage and distinctive voting patterns of those representatives). Indeed, Congress procured the
Fourteenth Amendment by placing the South under military rule, requiring Southern states to admit Black
voters, and making ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment a condition of readmission. See generally
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But, of course, this was stolen away by the resurgence of white supremacy
in the South, aided and abetted by the Supreme Court80—and so whither
Black authorship?
The Second Reconstruction, in the form of the civil rights revolution,
was largely a product of Black activism on the streets. However, at the time,
Black Americans suffered from a substantial deficit of authorial capacity in
the form of formal institutions, due to the massive disenfranchisement of
Black voters and discrimination against Black citizens in all sectors of the
economy and the educational system. Once again, the gains from the labor
of Black Americans and their allies promised the future of Black inclusion
in We the People. Yet the rise of the war on drugs and mass incarceration
once again broke those promises. Countless Black Americans have been
disenfranchised by the discriminatory application of antidrug laws and the
ensuing civil consequences of conviction, as well as, of course, being subject
to the direct arbitrary violence of the state.81 Indeed, we could argue that

Gabriel J. Chin, The “Voting Rights Act of 1867”: The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of
Suffrage During Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1589–91 (2004) (summarizing the Military
Reconstruction Act); James E. Bond, Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in
North Carolina, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 101–10 (1984) (describing the course of events in
North Carolina in which the Fourteenth Amendment was rejected before military rule, when Blacks were
deprived of the vote, but was swiftly ratified by the reconstructed government elected under Black
suffrage). On the idea of the nation as re-founded by the Reconstruction Amendments, see, for example,
Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution’s Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong Document?, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 1337, 1340 (1987) (“While the Union survived the Civil War, the Constitution did not. In its
place arose a new, more promising basis for justice and equality, the fourteenth amendment . . . .”). See
generally Garrett Epps, Second Founding: The Story of the Fourteenth Amendment, 85 OR. L. REV. 895
(2006) (arguing for a revolutionary interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Michael W.
McConnell, The Fourteenth Amendment: A Second American Revolution or the Logical Culmination of
the Tradition?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1159 (1992) (arguing for conception of the Fourteenth Amendment
as a continuation of constitutional law present in the original); Laurence Tribe, Bicentennial Blues: To
Praise the Constitution or To Bury It?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) (“But the Constitution of Thurgood
Marshall is also incomplete. It denies its own roots—and its own still unresolved contradictions—in the
process of professing its progressive character. To celebrate the Civil War amendments without
acknowledging the basic framework of carefully separated and divided powers into which those
amendments fit is to overlook the 18th-century institutional structures which alone made it possible for
Congress, in the late 19th century and again after the mid-20th, to implement the amendments’
guarantees.”). The tradition of thought beginning with Frederick Douglass—which I will draw out infra
in Part III—would not register surprise at the capacity of the Reconstruction Amendments to be presented
both as revolution and as continuation, just as Douglass himself recognized, see infra notes 134–142 and
accompanying text, both that the Constitution contained a latent promise of equality and that it would
require a radical break with the past to fulfill that promise.
80 Most notoriously, see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), which struck down federal
authority to respond to racial terrorism and use of force to prevent Black suffrage, and Giles v. Harris,
189 U.S. 475 (1903), in which the Court refused to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment against blatant
discriminatory application of suffrage criteria in Alabama.
81 See UGGEN ET AL., infra note 99; see also infra notes 100–109 and accompanying text (discussing
these statistics).
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Black Americans continue to embody the contrast against which citizenship
is defined. Professor Angela Davis argues that the incarceration of Black
Americans helps define the rights of liberal democracy by illustrating their
opposite, and that as slavery is social death, imprisonment is civil death.82
I contend that Black Americans continue to be excluded from the
American demos. To illustrate this exclusion, I focus on electoral exclusion
(among many other kinds of exclusion) and, in particular, the
disproportionate effect of felony disenfranchisement and its roots in multiple
layers of anti-Blackness.83 Felon disenfranchisement falls particularly
heavily on people of color, including Black Americans, because of the mass
incarceration policies that have been both intended and applied in a racially
discriminatory fashion.84 As Nixon aide John Ehrlichman confessed:
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two
enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying?
We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but
by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with
heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those
communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their
meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know
we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.85

82

ANGELA Y. DAVIS, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM: AND OTHER DIFFICULT DIALOGUES 125–26, 175
(2012).
83 That being said, there are numerous other ways in which Black Americans have been excluded
from the demos, such as by physical segregation and the way in which such segregation supports social
stigma and isolation. See generally Paul Gowder, Racial Classification and Ascriptive Injury, 92 WASH.
U. L. REV. 325, 363–85 (2014) (describing system of racial segregation, government culpability for same,
and stigmatic injury imposed by it). I limit the focus of this Section to electoral disenfranchisement only
because full inclusion in formal electoral institutions seems like the bare minimum to say that a group is
genuinely treated as a member of a democratic People, but do not by this limitation mean to assert that
the end of disenfranchisement would be sufficient to achieve inclusion.
84 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND
IMPRISONMENT (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004). In recent years, some
scholars have questioned Alexander’s specific causal account of mass incarceration. See, e.g., JOHN F.
PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL
REFORM (2017) (providing evidence that changes in prosecutorial charging decisions rather than drug
policy have driven mass incarceration). However, the argument of this Article does not depend on tracing
the pathway from anti-Blackness to mass incarceration through drug policy in particular.
85 Dan Baum, Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs, HARPERS MAG. (Apr. 2016),
https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all [https://perma.cc/37C4-9H3W]. After this story,
several former Nixon Administration officials issued a statement denying that Ehrlichman was serious
about this confession. Hilary Hanson, Nixon Aides Suggest Colleague Was Kidding About Drug War
Being Designed to Target Black People, HUFF. POST (Mar. 25, 2016, 5:32 PM), https://www.
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The connections between overcriminalization and disenfranchisement
are obvious: vast numbers of Black Americans are legally forbidden from
voting due to criminal convictions. I assert that this disenfranchisement is a
key form of contemporary exclusion from the American demos.
The history of felon disenfranchisement laws, particularly in the South,
is deeply tainted by racial discrimination. The Southern states enacted felon
disenfranchisement laws, in conjunction with laws aimed at criminalizing
activities thought to be engaged in predominantly by Black Americans, as
part of the rollback of Reconstruction and the start of Jim Crow.86 Even the
repeal of disenfranchisement laws shows signs of being race-based:
Professor Angela Behrens and others find that states with more Black
Americans in prison since 1940 have been less likely to repeal laws
disenfranchising former felons.87
The category of “infamous” crimes has often been the predicate of
disenfranchisement. Professor Pippa Holloway has convincingly argued that
the concept of infamous crimes served as a continuation of the same social
process by which Blackness has been defined as the opposite of

huffpost.com/entry/richard-nixon-drug-war-john-ehrlichman_n_56f58be6e4b0a3721819ec61
[https://perma.cc/K44U-E39J].
86 ELIZABETH A. HULL, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF EX-FELONS 18–21 (2006) (recounting
history of Reconstruction-era enactment of disenfranchisement laws in the South and evidence that those
laws targeted Black citizens); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 89, 111–12, 356–62, tbl.A.15 (rev. ed. 2009) (contextualizing
disenfranchisement laws with other restrictions on right to vote targeted against Black citizens in the
south, including “poll taxes, cumulative poll taxes (demanding that past as well as current taxes be paid),
literacy tests, secret ballot laws, lengthy residence requirements, elaborate registration systems, confusing
multiple voting-box arrangements, and eventually, Democratic primaries restricted to white voters”); JEFF
MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 41–68 (with Angela Behrens, 2006) (discussing the racial origins and explanations of felon
disenfranchisement laws in the United States); Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox
of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1090–95; see also
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (striking down—finally, in 1985—a provision of
Alabama’s Constitution disenfranchising those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, enacted in 1901,
on the ground that the 1901 revisions had the express goal “to establish white supremacy in this State”
and had succeeded by disenfranchising a disproportionate number of Black Americans); Ratliff v. Beale,
20 So. 865, 868 (Miss. 1896) (openly admitting that the purpose of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890
was “to obstruct the exercise of the franchise by the negro race” and that the motive for the choice of
crimes to bring under disenfranchisement was to select those thought likely to be committed by Black
Americans).
87 Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro Domination”: Racial
Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850–2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 591–94
(2003); see also MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 86, at 67.
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Americanness.88 Infamous crimes have been equated to felonies,89 but have
also historically been associated with crimes evidencing a lack of personal
honor, such as bigamy and perjury.90 She traces the history of the category
of infamy and its expressive use as a way to define noncitizenship, arguing
that it was rooted in the distinction between freemen and slaves in English
history—a distinction which transferred to American slaves.91 In the course
of extending this infamy to freed Black Americans, for example, Professor
Holloway recounts the selective identification of crimes associated with
Blackness and the elevation of those crimes to infamous status after
emancipation.92 In other words, American slaves were inherently infamous,
and after emancipation, states retained the infamy of former slaves by
disenfranchising them, predicating that disenfranchisement on crimes
associated with racialized beliefs about slavery and infamy. 93
Disenfranchisement both depended on the subordinated status of Blackness
and reinforced that subordinated status.
As recently as 2016, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the application
of the Iowa Constitution’s “infamous crime” clause was sufficient to permit
disenfranchisement of a citizen who had “delivered” cocaine to another.94
The Court so ruled over a dissent that pointed out the racially discriminatory
history of the “infamous crimes” standard as well as the disparate impact of
felony disenfranchisement on Black Americans.95
There is reason to believe that this disenfranchisement has led to
genuine political consequences. Professor Angela Davis argues that felon
disenfranchisement was responsible for the 2000 election of George W. Bush
as President, in virtue of his narrow margin of victory and the
disproportionate criminalization of Black Americans, in a context in which
Florida disenfranchised hundreds of thousands of people.96 Similarly,
88 PIPPA HOLLOWAY, LIVING IN INFAMY: FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 151–52 (2014).
89 See, e.g., Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W. 2d 182, 202–03 (Iowa 2016) (ruling, on the basis of
historically-rooted analysis, that infamous crimes under the Iowa Constitution includes all felonies).
90 HOLLOWAY, supra note 88, at 4.
91 Id. at 54–78; see also Ratliff, 20 So. at 868 (admitting to that strategy).
92 For more on the English category of “freeman” as a status descriptor, see PAUL GOWDER, THE
RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD 130–37 (2016).
93 HOLLOWAY, supra note 88, at 78.
94 Griffin, 884 N.W. 2d at 183.
95 Id. at 216–17 (Appel, J., dissenting)
96 President Bush won by a mere 537 votes. DAVIS, supra note 82, at 177. According to the Roper
Center, reporting on exit poll results, 90% of Black Americans voted for Al Gore in that election. ROPER
CTR. FOR PUB. OP. RES., CORNELL UNIV., HOW GROUPS VOTED IN 2000, https://ropercenter.cornell.
edu/polls/us-elections/how-groups-voted/how-groups-voted-2000
[https://perma.cc/2UH6-TZGK]
[hereinafter HOW GROUPS VOTED IN 2000] (based on exit polling data). Based on this study, Professor
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Professors Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza identify seven Senate
elections since 1978 in which the result arguably would have changed absent
felon disenfranchisement.97
Unfortunately, this problem has persisted into recent elections.98
According to a report prepared by several sociologists for the Sentencing
Project, an estimated 6.1 million people were disenfranchised in the United
States pursuant to a felony conviction in 2016, of whom 2.2 million were
Black.99
To illustrate the degree of Black exclusion from ordinary electoral
processes, let us look at several of the key battleground states in the 2016

Davis’s claim is wholly plausible. Moreover, before that election, Florida purged a number of eligible
voters from the rolls. News accounts have suggested that the list of felons—on the basis of which a
number of voters were purged—was rife with errors and overrepresented Black voters. See, e.g., Lisa
Getter, Florida Net Too Wide in Purge of Voter Rolls, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2001, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-may-21-mn-620-story.html
[https://perma.cc/F7KKRUJH] (recounting voter purges in Florida 2000 electorate containing non-felons and, in some counties,
disproportionate representation of Black Americans, including as much as 66% Black people in MiamiDade County).
97 Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 787–90 (2002) (identifying Senatorial
elections in Virginia in 1978, Texas in 1978, Kentucky in 1984, Florida in 1988, Wyoming in 1988,
Georgia in 1992, and Kentucky in 1998 as likely to have changed under the counterfactual of no
disenfranchisement). I note that all of these states except Wyoming are in the South, and all but Wyoming
and Kentucky were in the Confederacy. For the significance of that fact in terms of the continuing
influence of antebellum politics on contemporary race relations, see, for example, Acharya et al., The
Political Legacy of American Slavery, 78 J. POL. 621 (2016) (showing empirically that county-level
differences in prevalence of slavery are still correlated to contemporaneous attitudes in racial politics).
For a more subtle racial impact of felon disenfranchisement, see Brianna Remster & Rory Kramer,
Shifting Power: The Impact of Incarceration on Political Representation, 15 DU BOIS REV. 417 (2018)
(demonstrating, via analysis of Pennsylvania data, distortion in state-level voting power away from Black
citizens due to the disparate incarceration of Black Americans in rural communities away from home,
where they are disenfranchised but nonetheless counted as residents for the purpose of representation in
those districts).
98 That being said, there may be some grounds for hope that this will change, as Florida in 2018
repealed much of its former felon disenfranchisement. Tim Mak, Over 1 Million Florida Felons Win
Right
To
Vote
With
Amendment
4,
NPR
(Nov.
7,
2018,
2:46
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/11/07/665031366/over-a-million-florida-ex-felons-win-right-to-vote-withamendment-4 [https://perma.cc/P87U-CYJ8]. However, Florida’s implementation of this Amendment
has been subject to some controversy, with critics alleging that implementation legislation requiring
former felons to pay financial penalties associated with their convictions before being re-enfranchised
constitutes a poll tax. See, e.g., Katrina vanden Heuvel, A New Poll Tax Will Suppress Florida’s Voting
Reform, WASH. POST (May 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/05/14/new-polltax-will-suppress-floridas-voting-reform/?utm_term=.e406eba1f01f
[https://perma.cc/KZG8-7ETC]
(arguing that financial penalty payment requirement is unjust, in part because Florida imposes exorbitant
financial penalties on the convicted).
99 CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., SENTENCING PROJ., 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL
ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016, at 3, 16 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org
/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-Lost-Voters.pdf#page=17 [https://perma.cc/D234-5TT8].
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election. Combining data from the Sentencing Project report and the New
York Times state-by-state vote totals produces the following table:
TABLE 1: DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION100
State
MI
WI
PA
FL

Disenfranchised
All
Black
44,221
23,679
65,606
22,447
52,974
25,596
1,686,318
499,306

Trump Margin
10,704
22,748
44,292
112,911

Trump, of course, won 306 electoral votes to Clinton’s 232. Looking at
the table above, we see that the number of Black Americans disenfranchised
in both Michigan and Florida was larger than Trump’s margin of victory in
those states. While we cannot know how prisoners or disenfranchised former
felons would have voted, in view of the overwhelming share of Black votes
received by Clinton in 2016, there is at least a realistic possibility that
enfranchising those who were disenfranchised in those states, by permitting
both those incarcerated and former felons to vote, would have changed the
results in Florida and Michigan, causing forty-five electoral votes, and the
White House, to change hands.101
Obviously, this is not to say that the disenfranchisement of Black
Americans via racially discriminatory mass incarceration caused Trump’s
election. We cannot know what really would have happened. However, there
are many other ways that disenfranchisement of Black Americans potentially
still affects electoral results today—particularly in terms of the control of
state legislatures, and, with it, redistricting processes.
The Sentencing Project report reveals some truly astonishing
numbers.102 The first two columns of the following chart are their felon
disenfranchisement figures for some of the most striking states; the third is
my calculation of the percentage of non-Black citizens disenfranchised in
2016:

100 The numbers presented in the first two columns include both felons disenfranchised while in
prison and felons disenfranchised afterward, per post-release disenfranchisement provisions in those
states that have them. Id. at 15–16. The last column represents my Trump-Clinton subtractions from the
state-by-state vote totals reported by the New York Times. Presidential Election Results: Donald J.
Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/
results/president [https://perma.cc/7REB-8Q2D].
101 According to the Roper Center, 89% of Black Americans voted for Clinton. HOW GROUPS VOTED
IN 2000, supra note 96 (reporting on CNN exit polls).
102 See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 99.
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TABLE 2: RELATIVE DISENFRANCHISEMENT RATES IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION103
State
KY
TN
VA
FL
WY
All U.S.

Black
Disenfranchised
26%
21%
22%
21%
17%
7.44%

General Population
Disenfranchised
9%
8%
8%
10%
5%
2.47%

Non-Black
Disenfranchised
8%
6%
5%
9%
5%
1.8%

These figures show that in 2016 upwards of four times as many Black
Americans were disenfranchised as a percentage of the population.
Nor is felon disenfranchisement the only egregious form of ongoing,
race-based disenfranchisement. On July 29, 2016, the Fourth Circuit
identified blatant racial discrimination in changes to North Carolina’s
election laws.104 The reason? “[T]he legislature requested and received racial
data as to usage of the practices changed by the proposed law,” and then
turned around and eliminated those voting provisions that advantaged Black
voters.105 Specifically, it asked for data on types of ID used by voters and
then decreed that the types of ID predominantly used by Black voters would
no longer be sufficient for identification at the polls.106 It asked for data on
race and early voting and then eliminated the period most predominantly
used by Black voters.107 It asked for data on race and same-day registration,
found that Black voters disproportionately used it, and then eliminated it.108
There was not a lot of subtlety there.
Also not subtle: the 2015 closure of DMV offices in predominantly
Black Alabama counties, ultimately reversed only under pressure from the
U.S. Department of Transportation; unsurprisingly, this closure came on the

103 The calculation is carried out by subtracting the total Black disenfranchised from the total
disenfranchised population to get the total non-Black disenfranchised population, doing the same with
population as a whole, then dividing the former from the latter. All except total U.S. are rounded to nearest
whole percentage. Population figures are derived from the “VAP” (voting age population) figures in the
Sentencing Project data tables.
104 N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214–15 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he
new provisions target African Americans with almost surgical precision . . . we can only conclude that
the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the challenged provisions of the law with discriminatory
intent.”).
105 Id. at 216.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 217.
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heels of a voter ID law.109 Then again, Alabama isn’t exactly known for its
friendliness to Black voters: in 2011, state legislators were recorded
complaining about a gambling ballot measure because, well, read it yourself:
A confederate warned: “Just keep in mind if [a pro-gambling] bill passes and
we have a referendum in November, every black in this state will be bused to
the polls. And that ain’t gonna help.” . . . The participants predicted: “Every
black, every illiterate” would be “bused on HUD financed buses.” 110

Later, one of the legislators also described Black citizens of Alabama
as “aborigines.”111 Incidentally, it will surprise few readers who have made
it this far to learn that the stereotype underlying this particular act of
bigotry—the supposition that Black Americans are particularly susceptible
to social vices associated with lack of self-control, like gambling, and hence
particularly motivated to support a pro-gambling bill—also featured heavily
in the choices of crimes to subject to disenfranchisement in the postReconstruction period. For some strange reason, Southern Democrats
seemed to be particularly convinced that prospective Black voters couldn’t
resist stealing chickens (although the impoverishment of freed people in the
South didn’t help) and used this alleged lack of self-control of Black
Americans as a reason to impose disenfranchisement for this crime.112
Apparently these tropes are still here and still drive attempts at voter
suppression.
In the 2018 election, Georgia’s secretary of state, Brian Kemp, ran for
governor against Stacey Abrams. Abrams was vying to be Georgia’s first
Black governor and the first Black woman to be a governor of any state in
America. Prior to the election, Kemp engaged in a massive wave of
registration cancellations and blockages. In particular, the state wrote an
“exact match” voter registration process into law in 2017113—doubtless
109 Vann R. Newkirk II, What’s Missing from Reports on Alabama’s Black Turnout, ATLANTIC (Dec.
7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/can-doug-jones-get-enough-blackvoters-to-win/547574 [https://perma.cc/PR33-GWN7] (reporting on findings that DMV closures were
predominantly in the “Black Belt” region of Alabama).
110 United States v. McGregor, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1345 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (internal citations
omitted) (finding legislative witnesses lacked credibility in bribery prosecution related to gambling bill
because of racially discriminatory motivations).
111 Id. (“In a separate conversation, during which [Senator] Lewis asked whether the predominantly
black residents of Greene County were ‘y’all’s Indians?,’ [Senator] Beason responded by derisively
referring to blacks as ‘Aborigines.’”) (internal citations omitted).
112 HOLLOWAY, supra note 88, at 73–75 (quoting a number of examples).
113 O.G.C.A. § 21-2-220.1(b) (“In the event that the name . . . does not match information about the
applicant on file . . . the applicant shall nevertheless be registered to vote but shall be required to produce
proof of his or her identity . . . before the time that such applicant requests a ballot . . . .); see also Ga.
Coalition for the People’s Agenda v. Kemp, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1255–57 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (recounting
enactment of exact match).

369

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

thanks in no small part to the end of Voting Rights Act preclearance in Shelby
County v. Holder114—pursuant to which, tiny variations in voter information,
like variations in how last names are hyphenated, could lead to a voter’s
registration being put on hold. Kemp put some 53,000 registrations on hold;
according to the press, 70% of those whose registrations were put on hold
were Black, compared to 32% of Georgia’s citizens; moreover, Kemp
canceled hundreds of thousands of registrations for “inactivity.”115 Although
I do not have a 2018 estimate, according to the Sentencing Project data,
144,546 Black Georgians were disenfranchised for felonies in 2016, well
over half of Georgia’s 248,751 total felon disenfranchisements.116 According
to the New York Times, Brian Kemp’s margin of victory over Stacey Abrams
was 54,723 votes.117 After the election, Abrams all but called it stolen,
recounting “1.5 million people purged [from voter rolls], 53,000 [votes] put
on hold, 3,000 denied the right to register as new citizens.”118
These are merely the few cases where courts were able to do something,
or, as in the Georgia situation, where the media has at least caught the
suppression efforts, because of the presence of smoking-gun evidence. We
cannot know what lies in the shadows.
2. The Failure of the Constitutional Conception
Even after rejecting the mechanical conception of popular sovereignty,
the constitutional conception still requires that citizens be included in the
formal institutions of electoral politics to have a full role in the crossgenerational conversation the constitutional conception contemplates. But
the facts recounted above entail that Black Americans have been and
continue to be excluded from the demos—not, obviously, to the same extent
as in Jim Crow, but excluded nonetheless.

114 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). See Jurisdictions Previously Covered by
Section 5 at the Time of the Shelby County Decision, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 [https://perma.cc/EVS7-5LU6] (listing Georgia among
jurisdictions covered by Voting Rights Act preclearance formula at the time the Supreme Court struck it
down in Shelby County).
115 All of these details come from Ben Nadler, Report: Georgia’s Secretary of State Is Blocking
53,000 Voter Registrations As He Runs for Governor, TIME (Oct. 10, 2018), https://news.
yahoo.com/report-georgia-apos-secretary-state-231158238.html [https://perma.cc/TXZ4-G7MC].
116 UGGEN ET AL., supra note 99, at 15–16.
117 Georgia
Election
Results, N. Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019, 2:09
PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/us/elections/results-georgia-elections.html
[https://perma.cc/7RF7-9XGX].
118 Jessica Taylor, Stacey Abrams Says She Was Almost Blocked from Voting in Georgia Election,
NPR (Nov. 20, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/20/669280353/stacey-abrams-says-shewas-almost-blocked-from-voting-in-georgia-election
[https://perma.cc/W64X-AF8W].
Bracketed
additions are NPR’s.
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I do not aim here to give a full theory of exclusion. However, I can say
a few things about the concept as I see it. Exclusion seems to me to have both
expressive and practical components. Practically speaking, a group is
excluded when it lacks the formal and informal supports for participation in
the ongoing conversations about a state’s institutions contemplated by the
constitutional conception, as when its members have been formally or
informally disenfranchised, subject to arbitrary violence or criminalization,
or subject to economic discrimination and expropriation that undermines
their capacity for collective political activity. Expressively speaking, a group
is excluded when a state’s institutions have been operated such that the group
is either treated as a nonmember in writing or in practice—as it were, written
out of We the People. Expressive exclusion occurs when a state’s institutions
have been fleshed out in order to express a social hierarchy, within which
there are genuine members—who are accorded the rights of membership—
and subordinate classes.119
I claim that, in particular, the expressive meaning of Black exclusion
makes it difficult for anyone, of whatever racial background, to understand
Black Americans as co-authors of America’s political outcomes.
We can understand the exclusion of so many Black Americans from the
electoral process as creating an electorate that is identifiably less Black than
the general population, and hence imposing expressive injury on Black
Americans in general. Why should those who are excluded see themselves
as co-citizens? How can non-Black citizens understand Black citizens as
citizens in a world in which their participatory capacity, as well as those
interests of Black Americans that are achievable through the operation of
America’s ordinary political machinery, is systematically disadvantaged?120
Members of an excluded group cannot participate in a state’s
satisfaction of the criteria of the constitutional conception. They have no
reason to endorse institutions that express the aim of their subordination. The
development of those institutions lacks, except by accident or by force, their
participation in its learning and development. Thus, members of an excluded
group cannot understand themselves as authors of the political outcomes in
such a state—and, since the constitutional conception depends on all in the
demos being able to understand themselves as authors, it cannot (at least so
119

For a more complete account of what it means for law to express the subordinate status of some
group of people, see Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1021 (2014).
120 For another discussion of the expressive significance of felon disenfranchisement, see R.A.
Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 916–
24 (2004). On the problem of exclusion, criminal justice, and Black Americans more generally, see I.
Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle,
46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2011) (arguing that current constitutional criminal procedure doctrine
fails to treat people of color as equal citizens).
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far as the analysis has gotten to this point, for I shall aim to redeem it in the
next Part) legitimate states that engage in persistent and illegitimate
exclusion.121
Professor Seyla Benhabib, more than other scholars in the tradition of
the constitutional conception, has wrestled with the implications of exclusion
in the course of developing her cosmopolitan account of her version of
“jurisgenerative politics.”122 On Professor Benhabib’s argument, the
conception of the people in a democratic state is itself subject to
intergenerational, discursive revision. In her words: “Although the demos,
as the popular sovereign, must assert control over a specific territorial
domain, it can also engage in reflexive acts of self-constitution, whereby the
boundaries of the demos can be readjusted.”123 Yet the cases she considers
are primarily those relating to migration, that is, when some acknowledged
outsider enters into a pre-constituted political community that was,
presumptively, legitimate before migration. By contrast, the American case
is one in which the political community was incomplete and for that reason
illegitimate from the start.124 Black Americans fought in the American

121 Moreover, as I noted above, the constitutional conception can only preserve popular authorship
in the face of mass frustrations if there is some reserve capacity in the people to take the reins of political
outcomes; exclusion means some groups of people unjustifiably have less of that capacity.
122 SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 181 (2004)
(“Jurisgenerative politics refers to iterative acts through which a democratic people that considers itself
bound by certain guiding norms and principles reappropriates and reinterprets these, thus showing itself
to be not only the subject but also the author of the laws.” (emphasis omitted)). The term “jurisgenerative”
originated with Professor Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15
(1983), though Professor Benhabib sometimes uses the term differently. I confess that I find Professor
Cover’s use of the term somewhat obscure, though Professor Judith Resnik has offered a more lucid
explanation. Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert
Cover, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17, 18 (2005) (interpreting Cover to describe a kind of tension between
communal pluralism and the universalistic aspirations of liberal legality). The term is also associated with
Professor Michelman, and he, like Professor Benhabib, uses the term to refer to the capacity of a
population, through law, to become a demos capable of giving itself law. See Frank Michelman, Law’s
Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1502 (1988) (“One possible way of making sense of this is by conceiving
of politics as a process in which private-regarding ‘men’ become public-regarding citizens and thus
members of a people. It would be by virtue of that people-making quality that the process would confer
upon its law-like issue the character of law binding upon all as self-given.”). Professor Benhabib has,
however, sometimes suggested that her version of jurisgenerative politics is drawn from Cover’s and has
connected the two. See, e.g., Seyla Benhabib, Claiming Rights Across Borders: International Human
Rights and Democratic Sovereignty, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 691, 700–02 (2009) (using concept of
jurisgenerativity to connect local practices of Muslim communities and transnational law).
123 BENHABIB, supra note 37, at 35–36.
124 To be sure, the case of migration is not nearly as clean as that in practice, for, as Professor
Benhabib points out, France’s migration is in part due to its colonial and imperial adventures in Africa.
Id. at 68. But I note that there was nonetheless a France before that colonization, whereas there was no
America before slavery.
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Revolution and have never stood as foreigners to the United States.125 Thus,
Benhabib’s conception of progressive inclusion cannot redeem the American
demos on its own. We need a theory of constitutional popular sovereignty
not for a We the People that must decide how to integrate outsiders, but for
a We the People that has never been properly formed in the first place.
Moving from constitutional legitimacy to constitutional application,
Professor Jamal Greene has made points similar to those articulated in this
Section: on his argument, the fact of Black exclusion is an objection to
originalism, because originalism purports to commit constitutional theory to
a backward-looking interpretation of the text. Professor Greene argues that
this is incompatible with what I call the constitutional conception: if we
justify following the commands of prior generations by their “normative
continuity” with the People of the present, then we simply cannot read those
commands pursuant to a backward-looking perspective.126 I agree, and now
in Part III, I argue that Frederick Douglass and his intellectual heirs
articulated an account of the Constitution that can permit us to adopt the
forward-looking perspective and begin to build normative continuity.
III. FREDERICK DOUGLASS’S CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CYNICAL FAITH
The remainder of this Article will assume that the reader agrees that
Black Americans are still excluded from We the People—the argument that
follows may not move the reader who rejects this claim. I will further assume
that some version of the constitutional conception is the correct theory of
popular sovereignty, at least for countries like the United States; that is,
more-or-less legalistic states that claim liberal-democratic status.127 I shall
call such states aspirant liberal democracies. An aspirant liberal democracy
is a state with constitutional institutions sufficient to support the elements of
the constitutional conception described in the previous Part, even if they are
characterized by so much exclusion that they do not actually deserve the title.
The fact of persistent exclusion seems to permit one of two responses
for a citizen concerned to live under only democratic laws. First, one might
throw up one’s hands and reject the institutions of one’s state. Such a citizen
125 Of course, many American slaves were originally foreigners, kidnapped or sold from their own
nations, but the United States never accorded them the rights or status associated with foreigners, such as
the protection of embassies or support for their own linguistic, religious, or cultural traditions.
126 Jamal Greene, Originalism’s Race Problem, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 517, 520–521 (2011). Professor
James Fox has brilliantly taken up Greene’s challenge to articulate a “counterpublic” originalism which
centers the way that Black Americans have interpreted the constitution in understanding its original
meaning. James W. Fox, Jr., Counterpublic Originalism and the Exclusionary Critique, 67 ALA. L. REV.
675, 677 (2016).
127 By “legalistic states,” I just mean states with legal systems purporting to comport with the rule of
law.
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might grudgingly obey the laws because they are enforced by force, depart
the territory, or strive for revolutionary change.
Alternatively, one might retain some conditional attachment to the
constitutional institutions—not based in the supposition that there is a
genuine We the People capable of legitimating those institutions, but based
on their potential for grounding the creation of such a people in the future.
That is, such an attachment may rely on the potential for the inclusion of the
excluded, and, with that inclusion, the true constitution of the people, where
“constitution” is understood in the active sense, as the act of constituting that
people.
I will draw from Frederick Douglass and his intellectual heirs in a
robust Black American tradition of constitutional thought to argue that just
such a conditional attachment to the constitution of an aspirant liberal
democracy is available even in the face of persistent exclusion. Examining
how Douglass chose attachment, the reasoning he offered, and the stance he
took toward the Constitution, with elaborations and variations from later
Black American thinkers, reveals an attitude which, I contend, is appropriate
for all Americans to take toward their Constitution. It permits attachment to
such a constitution for the purpose of pressing the institutions it establishes
to actually work toward the values it expresses. If this effort is successful, it
permits that constitution to be legitimated, despite its origins, by a kind of
retroactive authorship, by and on behalf of the excluded, potentially
redeeming its corrupted history.128
A. Douglass on the Constitution and Slavery
While Black American political and legal thought is very diverse and
has adopted a wide range of stances toward the U.S. Constitution,129 there is
a distinctive strain of Black American thought that has focused on the way
in which the United States has failed to live up to its own fundamental values.
Recently, Professor Chris Lebron has elucidated this strain of thought in the
context of the intellectual heritage of the Movement for Black Lives; his

128 It is important to note that while this Article focuses on Black responses to the Constitution, Black
political and legal thought is not the only source for an egalitarian reframing of American constitutional
legitimacy. While the exclusion of Black Americans has been a defining feature of American legal
history, a full rebuilding of the demos must also take into account the perspectives of other subordinated
and excluded groups. See, e.g., Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law,
132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1789 (2019) (arguing for a reading of American constitutional law that more
fully integrates the encounter between the United States government and Native American nations).
129 Indeed, Douglass, my main source for these ideas, has come under criticism for naïveté, not just
from his contemporaries, but from ours. See, e.g., Charles W. Mills, Whose Fourth of July? Frederick
Douglass and “Original Intent”, in FREDERICK DOUGLASS: A CRITICAL READER 100–42 (Bill E. Lawson
& Frank M. Kirkland eds., 1999).
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words are apt on the subject. Describing Douglass and Ida B. Wells, he
writes:
Both thinkers challenged Americans to think more clearly and consistently
about the principles on which their citizenship was founded and the ways those
principles were violated when blacks demanded equality. Actions of
contemporary activists . . . also, following Douglass’s lead, have invoked the
principles of American democracy to call upon citizens to account for the
quality and content of their civic and moral convictions. 130

We could describe this, perhaps, as an “internal critique,” except that
usually when we talk about internal critique, we refer to critique of a system
from the standpoint of a participant in the system. As we shall see, the Black
Americans who have levied this critique have often only conditionally
understood themselves as participants in, as opposed to captives of, the
American system. Hence, it is not quite the same thing as internal critique as
the term is conventionally used. But it also is not just a second-person or pure
outsider’s allegation of hypocrisy either, “you’re not treating me the way
your purported values would dictate,” for Black Americans have never stood
as completely external to the American system. For example, the style of
critique Professor Lebron describes does not, it seems to me, resemble that
of an atheist scolding a Christian for not following Christ’s example. It is
something in between purely internal and purely external critique.
Hence, I will call the stance taken by this strain of thought “claimant
critique.” A claimant critic is a person who claims inclusion in a system,
where that system is predicated on a set of values, and those values ground
the claim for inclusion; the critic criticizes the system for betraying those
values by not including the critic. The critique is paired with a claim for
inclusion based on moral standing and a shared fate, and a conditional

130 CHRISTOPHER J. LEBRON, THE MAKING OF BLACK LIVES MATTER: A BRIEF HISTORY OF AN IDEA
34 (2017). The methodological approach of this Section, which combines intellectual history with
normative argument, is greatly indebted to the fine example set by Professor Lebron, as well as NICK
BROMELL, THE TIME IS ALWAYS NOW: BLACK THOUGHT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S.
DEMOCRACY 3 (2013). Both scholars model a kind of interpretive intellectual history which treats much
the same strain of Black thought as I discuss here. With the recognition that while there are many other
strains of Black thought, I, like Professors Lebron and Bromell, suggest the selective interpretation of this
one line can reveal truths that may help us understand the American experience and the abstract values,
such as democracy and equality, that America has always claimed. Intellectual historians of Black
American thought often, following a classic article by Professor Bernard Boxill, describe Douglass as
part of the “assimilationist” tradition, to be contrasted with a “separatist” one. See Bernard Boxill, Two
Traditions in African American Political Philosophy, in AFRICAN-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES AND
PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS 119 (John P. Pittman ed., 1997). This classification seems too broad to
capture the distinctive constitutional ideas found in Douglass’s later thought and his successors in that
tradition. Thus, while this Section could be understood as describing a subcategory of the assimilationist
tradition, I do not find the assimilationist/separatist typology useful here.
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endorsement of the values. We can imagine the claimant critic saying
something like this: “We’re in this together, because you dragged my
ancestors over here, and I kind of like these values you assert; why don’t you
follow them and treat me as a full participant in the scheme of social relations
that is supposed to instantiate those values—which, critically, purport to
include values of equal inclusion.”131
Not only is this strain of thought a set of moral claims, but, at least on
Douglass’s example, it is also a set of legal claims. To see how this works,
let us begin with a passage from a speech of Douglass’s in Glasgow, Scotland
in 1860, entitled The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or
131

Douglass most perfectly expressed the idea of claimant critique in his Fourth of July speech. As
Bromell points out, Douglass simultaneously assumes both an insider and an outsider stance, both
emphasizing the distance that was present between himself and his audience and at the same time
claiming, repeatedly, the status of fellow citizen. BROMELL, supra note 130, at 110–11; see also HOANG
GIA PHAN, BONDS OF CITIZENSHIP: LAW AND THE LABORS OF EMANCIPATION 144–45 (2013) (fleshing
out the point further). Consider, as representative, the following passage:
Fellow-citizens, pardon me, allow me to ask, why am I called upon to speak here to-day? What
have I, or those I represent, to do with your national independence? Are the great principles of
political freedom and of natural justice, embodied in that Declaration of Independence, extended
to us? and am I, therefore, called upon to bring our humble offering to the national altar, and to
confess the benefits and express devout gratitude for the blessings resulting from your
independence to us?
Would to God, both for your sakes and ours, that an affirmative answer could be truthfully
returned to these questions! Then would my task be light, and my burden easy and delightful. For
who is there so cold, that a nation’s sympathy could not warm him? Who so obdurate and dead to
the claims of gratitude, that would not thankfully acknowledge such priceless benefits? Who so
stolid and selfish, that would not give his voice to swell the hallelujahs of a nation’s jubilee, when
the chains of servitude had been torn from his limbs? I am not that man. In a case like that, the
dumb might eloquently speak, and the “lame man leap as an hart.”
But such is not the state of the case. I say it with a sad sense of the disparity between us. I am
not included within the pale of this glorious anniversary! Your high independence only reveals
the immeasurable distance between us. The blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not
enjoyed in common.—The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence,
bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me. The sunlight that brought light and
healing to you, has brought stripes and death to me. This Fourth July is yours, not mine. You may
rejoice, I must mourn. To drag a man in fetters into the grand illuminated temple of liberty, and
call upon him to join you in joyous anthems, were inhuman mockery and sacrilegious irony. Do
you mean, citizens, to mock me, by asking me to speak to-day? If so, there is a parallel to your
conduct. And let me warn you that it is dangerous to copy the example of a nation whose crimes,
towering up to heaven, were thrown down by the breath of the Almighty, burying that nation in
irrevocable ruin! I can to-day take up the plaintive lament of a peeled and woe-smitten people!
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro (July 5, 1852), in FREDERICK
DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 188, 194 (Philip S. Foner ed., abridged & adapted by
Yuval Taylor, 1999) [hereinafter DOUGLASS].
Observe how Douglass juxtaposes the form of address, “Fellow-citizens,” which he repeats numerous
times through the speech, with the second-person form of address paired with the facts that emphasize
the “immeasurable distance” between himself and those ostensible “fellow-citizens,” and thus renders
that address less one of mutual respect than of biting sarcasm.
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Anti-Slavery?132 This speech is the fullest statement of his (late-career)
position on the Constitution and slavery.
In this speech, Douglass aimed to refute the Garrisonian position on the
Constitution. The Garrisonians were fellow abolitionists, but they thought
that the Constitution was an irrevocably proslavery document and hence
advocated for its abandonment.133 Douglass, at least by this point, disagreed
and thought the Constitution could be redeemed. The bulk of the speech is a
careful textual analysis in which Douglass raises numerous seemingly
sinister clauses and argues that each need not be read to permit slavery,
despite the evil meaning that both slaveholders and Garrisonians would put
on it. But his work is not yet done, for the Constitution is also a statement of
values, and he sees an irrevocable conflict between Constitutional values and
slavery, a conflict which forbids the conventional, proslavery, reading of
those passages:
Let us look at the objects for which the Constitution was framed and adopted,
and see if slavery is one of them. Here are its own objects as set forth by itself:—
“We, the people of these United States, in order to form a more perfect union,
establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution of the United States of
America.” The objects here set forth are six in number: union, defence, welfare,
tranquility, justice, and liberty. These are all good objects, and slavery, so far
from being among them, is a foe of them all.134

These values become a guide to constitutional interpretation. His
argument is not just that it would be immoral to read the Constitution to be
a proslavery document, but that legal interpretive principles, according to
which a law is to be read in accordance with its goals and the values
underlying it, also forbid such a reading:
The speaker at the City Hall laid down some rules of legal interpretation. These
rules send us to the history of the law for its meaning. I have no objection to
such a course in ordinary cases of doubt. But where human liberty and justice
are at stake, the case falls under an entirely different class of rules. There must
132 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery?
(Mar. 26, 1860), in DOUGLASS, supra note 131, at 380–90. Other extended explications of Douglass’s
approach to the Constitution include an editorial in The North Star entitled The Constitution and Slavery,
in DOUGLASS, supra note 131, at 129–33, and an 1857 speech entitled The Dred Scott Decision, in
DOUGLASS, supra note 131, at 344–58. After emancipation, he continued the same theme in a speech
entitled The Civil Rights Case, in DOUGLASS, supra note 131, at 685–93, condemning the Civil Rights
Cases, see 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
133 See generally Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the
Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 424–25 (1999) (describing the Garrisonian position).
134 DOUGLASS, The Constitution of the United States, supra note 132, at 379, 387.
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be something more than history—something more than tradition. The Supreme
Court of the United States lays down this rule, and it meets the case exactly—
“Where rights are infringed—where the fundamental principles of the law are
overthrown—where the general system of the law is departed from, the
legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness.” The same
court says that the language of the law must be construed strictly in favour of
justice and liberty. Again, there is another rule of law. It is—Where a law is
susceptible of two meanings, the one making it accomplish an innocent purpose,
and the other making it accomplish a wicked purpose, we must in all cases adopt
that which makes it accomplish an innocent purpose. Again, the details of a law
are to be interpreted in the light of the declared objects sought by the law. I set
these rules down against those employed at the City Hall. To me they seem just
and rational. I only ask you to look at the American Constitution in the light of
them, and you will see with me that no man is guaranteed a right of property in
man, under the provisions of that instrument. If there are two ideas more distinct
in their character and essence than another, those ideas are “persons” and
“property,” “men” and “things.” Now, when it is proposed to transform persons
into “property” and men into beasts of burden, I demand that the law that
contemplates such a purpose shall be expressed with irresistible clearness. The
thing must not be left to inference, but must be done in plain English.135

While Douglass was not a lawyer, he applies interpretive principles that
closely track techniques used in constitutional law even today. Political
theorist Anthony Ives suggests that Douglass’s method of interpretation
tracks legal philosopher Lon Fuller’s methodology, insofar as it understands
the formal character of law to operate as a constraint on its capacity to do
great evil.136 As I read the Glasgow speech, it more closely resembles the
“moral reading” of the Constitution advanced by legal theorists such as
Ronald Dworkin137 and James Fleming,138 and, more broadly, Dworkin’s
general value-laden technique of legal interpretation and legal theorist David
Dyzenhaus’s argument that common law judges may use their interpretive
powers to resist unjust acts of parliament.139 Douglass clearly sees the
135

Id. at 386–87.
Anthony Lister Ives, Frederick Douglass’s Reform Textualism: An Alternative Jurisprudence
Consistent with the Fundamental Purpose of Law, 80 J. POL. 88, 98–99 (2018).
137 See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 2–12 (1996) (describing and defending “moral reading” of Constitution).
138 See JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS
AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS 74–81 (2015) (describing and defending “philosophic approach” to
constitutional interpretation).
139 See DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: PATHOLOGIES OF LEGALITY
143–44 (2d ed., 2010) (describing the way in which apartheid warped the South African legal system and
the ways that common-law judging permitted legal resistance to it); DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 4 (2006) (arguing that common-law judges
have the authority to uphold the rule of law against legislative overreach in times of emergency).
136
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Constitution as a purpose-driven document, in which the Preamble describes
a set of values in pursuit of which the operative text must be interpreted. As
Ives also explains, the purposes of the Constitution are explicitly not the
purposes of the people who wrote it.140 Rather, the purposes are those
attributed to We the People in the text.141 We might say that Douglass
modeled the United States Constitution as representing the constructive aims
of an agent—We the People—imperfectly attempting to fulfill the values
stated in the Preamble.
Douglass does not just draw on the Preamble, but also focuses on
specific operative passages to suggest that even ordinary textualist legal
readings of those passages, if carried out faithfully, prohibit slavery:
They go everywhere else for proof that the Constitution is pro-slavery but to the
Constitution itself. The Constitution declares that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; it secures to every man
the right of trial by jury, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus—that great
writ that put an end to slavery and slave-hunting in England—it secures to every
State a republican form of government. Any one of these provisions, in the
hands of abolition statesmen, and backed up by a right moral sentiment, would
put an end to slavery in America.142

Thus, he denied the dominant white supremacist constitutional
interpretation and insisted that the Constitution could be interpreted in terms
of the values to which it appealed—an interpretation inconsistent with
slavery. That is, Douglass endorsed the United States Constitution—not as
it had been interpreted by the officials who administered the juridical
infrastructure of slavery, but as it could be interpreted by a faithful adherent
to the values it purported to write into law.143
Still, Douglass did not believe that the mere ordinary application of
legal interpretive rules through the courts would bring about the end of
140

Ives, supra note 136, at 90–93. Professor Phan helpfully elaborates the literature on Douglass’s
constitutionalism and the idea that he rejected originalism in favor of a kind of pure textualism and
usefully places Douglass in the context of debates over the role of intent that were happening both then
and now. PHAN, supra note 131, at 107–41.
141 This cannot just be a flavor of originalism focusing on the original intent of ordinary citizens
rather than the Framers, for Douglass would have had no particular reason to think or claim that ordinary
people had any different attitude to slavery than did the Framers. It must be a constructive purpose,
derived solely from the claims of purpose written in the document itself as well as the substantive proliberty provisions on which Douglass relied (such as the prohibition on bills of attainder and the protection
of the writ of habeas corpus).
142 DOUGLASS, The Constitution of the United States, supra note 132, at 388.
143 Professor Phan also points out a passage in Life and Times in which Douglass offers a similarly
expansive reading of the limited terms of the Emancipation Proclamation. PHAN, supra note 131, at 206–
07. Although, as I read the passage in question, it is ambiguous whether Douglass’s expansive
interpretation of it focused on its quasi-legal content or what he terms its “moral power.”
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slavery. The hand of “abolition statesmen” would be required, and, of course,
abolition statesmen were not fully in control until after a bloody war was
fought. Moreover, he recognized that the unbroken course of interpretation
of the Constitution had been proslavery:
But to all this it is said that the practice of the American people is against my
view. I admit it. They have given the Constitution a slaveholding interpretation.
I admit it. They have committed innumerable wrongs against the Negro in the
name of the Constitution. Yes, I admit it all; and I go with him who goes farthest
in denouncing these wrongs. But it does not follow that the Constitution is in
favour of these wrongs because the slaveholders have given it that
interpretation.144

So he must have known that bringing about the constitutional
interpretations he proposed within ordinary legal processes was a tall order.
The Supreme Court wasn’t about to wake up one morning and declare
slavery unconstitutional in a context in which slaveholders held immense
political power. Moreover, he surely must have known that the plantation
owners would not give up their slaves peacefully, law or no law. There is an
implicit kind of hopefulness (or what I will in a moment call “cynical faith”)
in this. The Constitution seems to express, to Douglass, something
worthwhile, which he cannot but believe in, even as he knows that the
ordinary, lawful institutional paths to achieving that value aren’t likely to
come about.
As Professor Lebron explains, Douglass challenged the American
people to live up to the ideals “that the founding committed the everyday
American to uphold.”145 That is, their public identity, via their Constitution,
committed the (not-yet properly constituted) American demos to those
ideals. Moreover, Professor Lebron also suggests, I think wisely, that
Douglass understood American constitutional institutions, and the
interpretations and practices they generated, to serve an educative role.146 An
antislavery interpretation of the Constitution would potentially help
bootstrap a moral education for Whites—they couldn’t see the evil of slavery
on their own, but, perhaps, if they were shown how the values that
supposedly formed the foundation of their own fundamental institutions
condemned that evil, their experience operating institutions expressing those
values could teach them to hate slavery.

144

DOUGLASS, The Constitution of the United States, supra note 132, at 388.
LEBRON, supra note 130, at 12–16.
146 Id. at 14–16 (arguing that Douglass saw American legal institutions as shaping the character of
the American people, to “educate and habituate the citizens over which they held sway.”).
145
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Professor Nicholas Bromell traces this approach to American
institutions to Douglass’s time in exile—his time in the British Isles revealed
that people of other nations esteemed the Declaration of Independence as a
statement of universal human value, and, it seems, inspired in him a deeper
attachment to those values.147 In Professor Bromell’s words, “the experience
of being nationless allowed Douglass to reconceive the meaning of his nation
and of its founding document, the Declaration.”148 Professor Bromell thus
reads Douglass as a cosmopolitan constitutional patriot, prefiguring
Professor Benhabib’s articulation of similar ideas.149
We can add to Professor Bromell’s point an insight from Professor
Hoang Phan, who points out that Douglass, in a reply to John C. Calhoun,
offers his textualist constitutional interpretation through the device of “a man
from another country.”150 Professor Phan reads this to emphasize the
textualism and anti-originalism of Douglass’s constitutional thought, but I
would add that it is significant that Douglass posits the eyes of a foreigner,
of one coming to the Constitution and the values it expresses untainted by
the corruptions of slavery—just as the very foreigners with whom Douglass
interacted could have seen it.
In effect, Douglass strives to achieve the things that the constitutional
conception describes. He strives to endorse the Constitution and to make it a
thing worth endorsing, consistent with the true meaning of its words as read
from an outsider perspective and thus without the taint of slavery.151 He
strives to interpret the Constitution in a way that makes it fit to participate in
a process of social learning. And he strives to be fully included in the We the
People who get to shape it. In doing so, he gives voice to the values
147 BROMELL, supra note 130, at 82–85 (recounting Douglass’s experience with observing display
of Declaration of Independence in places of honor in homes in Ireland and arguing that Douglass
perceived capacity of Declaration to serve as universalistic statement of human value).
148 Id. at 83.
149 Strikingly Professor Bromell also finds this idea on what we might have at one point (around
2008, say) mistakenly conceived as the opposite end of the arc of Black American history, a speech of
President Obama’s at West Point in which he described the capacity of other countries too to claim the
ideals in our Declaration. Id. at 138–39. For a transcript of the speech in question, see Barack Obama,
Commencement Address at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point (May 22, 2010),
in TIME (June 2, 2016), https://time.com/4340845/obama-commencement-speech-transcript-west-point
[https://perma.cc/R392-6U54] (“We believe, ‘that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness’ . . . . It is a belief that has been claimed by people of every race and religion in every region
of the world.”).
150 PHAN, supra note 131, at 3–5, 109–12.
151 I deliberately equivocate here between the outsider perspective of the slave and the outsider
perspective of the foreigner, both of which Douglass adopts, in order to claim insider status on the basis
of the words read as an outsider. In other words: reading the Constitution as an outsider would allows us
to understand that the enslaved ought to have been treated as insiders, as members of the demos.
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underlying the Constitution and expresses at least the possibility of a
relationship of mutual affirmation between the American people as a whole
and their constitutional values.
B. A Model of Black Constitutional Claimant Critique
As with the constitutional conception, I shall sketch a model of the
version of Black American constitutionalism which I defend and which is
rooted in Douglass’s Glasgow speech. After describing this model in the
abstract, I will further illustrate it through important exemplars of Black
American constitutional thought after Douglass. I will then conclude by
describing its implications for restoring a kind of provisional legitimacy to
aspirant liberal democratic constitutionalism, even in the face of exclusion,
by correcting the most important oversights of the constitutional conception.
Rather than an account of popular sovereignty as such, this Section is a
model of a stance toward the American Constitution and its democratic
claims which can serve as critique of, and an amendment to, the
constitutional conception. The elements of this model are thus arranged to
correspond to the equivalent elements of the model of the constitutional
conception articulated above in six parts.
First, a recognition that Black Americans have been, and continue to
be, excluded from full inclusion in We the People, that group of Americans
on whose behalf American constitutional institutions and political outcomes
purport to speak. This recognition is combined with a claim for inclusion in
that People, or demos, not just on the basis of a moral claim to inclusion, but
also on the basis of a constitutional reading. Correctly interpreted and
applied in accordance with the values it purports to uphold, the Constitution
already commands the full inclusion of Black Americans.152
Second, a conditional attachment to the Constitution: if it actually
becomes applied—as it can be—to include Black Americans, then it is worth
keeping. That is, an evaluative attitude toward the (idealized) Constitution
as worth preserving and promoting in virtue of its capacity to provide both a
normative framework grounding that claim to inclusion as well as an
institutional framework for filling out that inclusion in the form of concrete

152 In terms of the constitutional model, this is a recognition that the values of the Constitution are
not institutionalized—the state’s system of political organization and pattern of outcomes cannot be
interpreted as the actions of an agent pursuing the values that the Constitution claims it is. In terms of our
actual constitutional law today, full inclusion might entail, for example, doctrinal modifications requiring
more aggressive scrutiny of racially disparate criminal justice practices or felon disenfranchisement laws,
and the overruling of Shelby County v. Holder.
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legal rights and protections. This amounts to a positive vision of the
Constitution as a map from the excluded present to the included future.153
Third, a commitment to real-world collective political action to bring
about that inclusion and hence to reconstitute the demos and the concomitant
recognition that, in the absence of such action, the inclusion will not occur
and the Constitution will not be redeemed.
Fourth, a vision of the Constitution as educational. The values it utters,
and the way in which those both within and without the currently
acknowledged membership of the demos fill out those values through
understanding as well as political action, can educate the populace as a whole
about how their shared life ought to be lived.
Fifth, a specifically identity-composing consequence to that
constitutional claim: only with the inclusion of Black Americans will We the
People actually exist as a coherent collective identity. And only then will
Americans of any and all races have a stable and fully formed social identity.
Inclusion creates the constitutional demos—and in the absence of this
inclusion, the partial demos is doomed to failure.
Finally, a cynical faith. This is the simultaneous holding of two attitudes
toward the Constitution. First, a difficulty believing that the Constitution will
ever be allowed to fulfill its potential, due to the conflicting interests of those
in power. Second, the experience of seeing brief glimmerings of its potential
and hence a lingering belief in that potential and willingness to work to
pursue it.
In the following Sections, I will pull out some salient examples of this
stance. This is a highly selective pass through intellectual history—my claim
is not that these thinkers are representative of the entirety of Black American
constitutional thought, or even that the passages I draw out are properly
representative of the thought of each of the thinkers discussed. Rather, I
claim merely that we can see a continuous strand of intellectual engagement
with America’s Constitution and nascent/potential demos woven through the
passages I discuss, and it is a strand worth holding onto (and worth weaving
into the constitutional conception from Part II); the texts I have discussed
here were chosen for their capacity to saliently illustrate this line of thought.

153 Professor Hendrik Hartog sees the connection between these first two pieces of the model
(although I disagree with his characterization of it as “unsettling”): on his account, many groups who
have aspired to constitutional inclusion in the United States have asserted that present constitutional
interpretations grounding their exclusion (and, as Hartog weirdly emphasizes, vesting rights—like the
“right to segregate”—in others) have always been illegitimate. This claim implies the “threat” of
delegitimation of the constitutional order as a whole if it cannot correct these grievous errors. Hendrik
Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All,” 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013,
1024–25 (1987).
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Different elements of this stance have appeared in the words of different
thinkers across time and place. While I will attempt to maintain a broadly
chronological approach, I shall move in and out of various thinkers and time
periods as necessary to draw out the relatedness of the ideas articulated.
Ultimately the narrative below repeatedly cycles through Black American
history to draw out different elements of constitutional claimant critique.
C. Claimant Critique and Cynical Constitutional Faith in
Black American Thought
Let us begin with Douglass’s antebellum contemporaries in the North.
In 1838, Black citizens of Pennsylvania were called upon to argue against a
state constitutional revision which would limit the suffrage to whites.154
Shortly beforehand, the state supreme court had misread the prior
constitution to include a racial limitation of suffrage despite its complete
absence from the text.155 Abolitionist Robert Purvis and others penned a
response to the case and to the proposed amendment.
Unlike Douglass, Purvis and his collaborators do not focus on a
moralized reading of the Constitution, but they nonetheless appeal to
American foundational values and to the historical standing of Black
Pennsylvanians, since, in the North, such a standing could more easily be
demonstrated. They express a faith in the [state] constitution as written to be
able to overcome the misreadings of the court:
The Convention of 1790, by striking out the word “WHITE,” fixed the same
standard of qualification for all; and, in fact, granted and guarantied “civil
liberty” to all who possessed that qualification. Are we now to be told, that the
Convention did not intend to include colored men, and that BENJAMIN
154

See generally Roy H. Akagi, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1838, 48 PA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 301, 317–19 (1924) (recounting debate in convention over disenfranchisement); Eric Ledell
Smith, The End of Black Voting Rights in Pennsylvania: African Americans and the Pennsylvania
Constitutional Convention of 1837–1838, 65 PA. HIST. 279 (1998) (describing background of
disenfranchisement and Black protest).
155 Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 559–60 (Pa. 1837) (holding that term “freeman” in the description
of the electorate in Pennsylvania constitution could not mean freed slave, disregarding fact that
constitutional convention had struck “white” out of the requirement). While the court may have been
correct in its historical analysis of the word “freeman,” see GOWDER, supra note 92, at 131–37 (describing
the concept of the freeman, or liber homo, in English legal history), its refusal to acknowledge the far
more natural interpretation of striking out the word “white” seems, at best, highly questionable. In fact,
the court articulated a quite implausible theory for why the word “white” was removed: “it was feared
that respectable men of dark complexion would often be insulted at the polls, by objections to their
colour.” Hobbs, 6 Watts at 559. Yet, of course, that result could not be avoided by removing the word
“white” but retaining a racial qualification for suffrage, as a person “of dark complexion” could just as
easily have been “insulted at the polls” by disputing their race. See generally Ariela J. Gross, WHAT
BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA (2008) (recounting history of legal
disputes over racial status and racial ambiguity).
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FRANKLIN did not know what he was about, forasmuch as it was impossible
for a colored man to become a citizen of the commonwealth?
It may here be objected to us, that in point of fact we have lost by the recent
decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of Fogg vs. Hobbs, whatever claim
to the right of suffrage we may have had under the Constitution of 1790; and
hence have no reason to oppose the amended Constitution. Not so. We hold our
rights under the present Constitution none the cheaper for that decision. The
section already cited gives us all that we ask—all that we can conceive it in the
power of language to convey. Reject, fellow citizens, the partial, disfranchising
Constitution offered you by the Reform Convention, and we shall confidently
expect that the Supreme Court will do us the justice and itself the honor to
retract its decision. Should it not, our appeal will still be open to the conscience
and common sense of the people, who through their chief magistrate and a
majority of two-thirds of both branches of the Legislature may make way to the
bench of the Supreme Court, for expounders of the Constitution who will not
do violence to its most sacred and fundamental principles. 156

Note how, in that passage, Purvis relies on the belief in a genuine
constitutional demos including Black Pennsylvanians, which had it in its
power to take control of the rogue Supreme Court. This is just how I said
above that the constitutional conception must respond to such judicial
misbehavior.157
The Pennsylvania declaration in turn appealed to the Declaration of
Independence and offered conditional allegiance only to the state it formed:
We lay hold of the principles which Pennsylvania asserted in the hour which
tried men’s souls—which BENJAMIN FRANKLIN and his eight colleagues,
in the name of the commonwealth, pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their
sacred honor to sustain. We take our stand upon that solemn declaration, that to
protect inalienable rights “governments are instituted among men, deriving their
JUST POWERS from the CONSENT of the governed,” and proclaim that a
government which tears away from us and our posterity the very power of
CONSENT, is a tyrannical usurpation which we will never cease to oppose. We
have seen with amazement and grief the apathy of white Pennsylvanians while
the “Reform Convention” has been perpetrating this outrage upon the good old
principles of Pennsylvania freedom. But however others may forsake these
principles, we promise to maintain them on Pennsylvania soil, to the last man.
If this disfranchisement is designed to uproot us, it shall fail. Pennsylvania’s

156

ROBERT PURVIS ET AL., APPEAL OF FORTY THOUSAND CITIZENS, THREATENED WITH
DISENFRANCHISEMENT, TO THE PEOPLE OF PENNSYLVANIA 6–7 (1838), https://archive.org/
details/appealoffortytho00purv/page/n3 [https://perma.cc/W9LT-4ALU]. For the attribution of this
document, see Nicholas Wood, “A Sacrifice on the Altar of Slavery”: Doughface Politics and Black
Disenfranchisement in Pennsylvania, 1837–1838, 31 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 75, 76 (2011).
157 See supra text accompanying notes 62–72 for a discussion of “democratic frustrations.”
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fields, vallies, mountains, and rivers; her canals, railroads, forests, and mines;
her domestic altars, and her public, religious and benevolent institutions; her
Penn and Franklin, her Rush, Rawle, Wistar, and Vaux; her consecrated past
and her brilliant future, are as dear to us as they can be to you. Firm upon our
old Pennsylvania BILL OF RIGHTS, and trusting in a God of Truth and Justice,
we lay our claim before you, with the warning that no amendments of the
present Constitution can compensate for the loss of its foundation principle of
equal rights, nor for the conversion into enemies of 40,000 friends. 158

Thus, faced with the threat of impending exclusion, the Black citizens
of Pennsylvania laid a strong claim to co-citizenship with White
Pennsylvanians, a community of interest as well as shared enterprise on the
basis of the state constitution, as well as of the values described in the
Declaration of Independence.159
1. The Declaration of Independence as Prophecy
It is worth taking a moment to specifically consider the constitutional
status of the Declaration of Independence, which recurs frequently in this
Part. The Declaration can be seen as a constitutional document for the reason
given by legal scholar Jack Balkin: “The Declaration is our constitution. It is
our constitution because it constitutes us, constitutes us as a people
‘conceived in liberty, and dedicated to a proposition.’”160 In other words, the
Declaration stands in a similar relation to the American demos as the
Constitution does, as a speech act that both claims to represent the American
people and simultaneously creates it. We might say that our history contains
two documentary assertions of constituent power on behalf of the American
people—the power to declare itself a separate popular entity and the power
to proclaim its fundamental law.
Reconstruction historian Eric Foner explains that Black Americans in
the nineteenth century saw the Declaration as expressing the aspirations
which the Constitution also expressed and then claimed to fill out.161 As
W.E.B. Du Bois said, “[T]here are to-day no truer exponents of the pure
human spirit of the Declaration of Independence than the American
Negroes . . . .”162

158

PURVIS ET AL., supra note 156, at 18.
For instance, other parts of the document emphasized the fighting of Black Americans in the
Revolutionary War and the payment of taxes by Black Pennsylvanians.
160 J.M. Balkin, The Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J.
167, 168 (1999); see also Alexander Tsesis, Self-Government and the Declaration of Independence,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 693 (2012) (discussing the legal significance of the Declaration).
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Abolitionist James McCune Smith, in 1843, cast these ideas in the
language of destiny and purification.163 Arguing that the United States merely
“simulate[s] a Republican form of Government,”164 he contrasts the position
of Black Americans to those of the Jews in Egypt—the Jews had the destiny
to leave Egypt to become free, while the Black American has the destiny to
remain in America and create American freedom:
One law then, at least, we are by our position destined to exhibit; and that is that
the enslaved should remain upon the soil, and amid the institutions which
enthral them in order to bring liberty to the one by purifying the other. 165

Like Purvis, Smith draws heavily on the Declaration of Independence—
which could serve as the genuine documentary instantiation of constitutional
value unavailable to the Constitution itself because of the twisting of the
latter to permit slavery. Thus, Smith contrasts the Constitution, a corrupted
document, with the Declaration, a pure document, prophesying that the
destiny of the Black American is to raise the former to meet the high standard
of the latter:
This very doctrine is contained in the American Declaration of Independence,
which declares “all men to have certain unalienable rights.” But the Constitution
of these United States, professedly constructed on the above principles, hold
that there are some “other persons”—besides all men—who are not entitled to
these rights. We are those “other persons”—we are the exception. It is our
destiny to prove that even this exception is wrong, and therefore contrary to the
highest interests of the whole people, and to eradicate from the Constitution this
exception, so contrary to its general principles. 166

He goes on to declare that to fulfill this destiny will be the salvation of
the Republic as well. Importantly, he describes this salvation as
“conservative,” as merely achieving the claims that American government
already makes.
What will be the result? Slavery must cease and over its grave there will grow
up a pure Republic. The destiny then, which we must fulfill in relation to the
form of government under which we dwell is eminently conservative. We will
save the form of government and convert it into a substance. 167

Smith can be seen as a forebear of a tradition of thought around Black
destiny and American inclusion. Along these lines, theologian Sarah
163 JAMES MCCUNE SMITH, The Destiny of the People of Color (1843), in THE WORKS OF JAMES
MCCUNE SMITH: BLACK INTELLECTUAL AND ABOLITIONIST 48 (John Stauffer ed., 2006).
164 Id. at 50.
165 Id. at 51.
166 Id. at 52.
167 Id. at 55.
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Azaransky characterizes the great civil rights lawyer and activist (and law
professor, and poet, and priest) Pauli Murray’s approach to the unfulfilled
promise of American democracy as “democratic eschatology”—a
theological approach to democratic inclusion that represents doctrine as “the
conclusion of God’s purposes, things yet to be seen, and, simply, things
hoped for.”168 The purpose of eschatology, according to Azaransky, is to
encourage Christians to build the Kingdom of the future (one cannot help but
be reminded of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I may not get there with you”).169
The tradition of thought I describe in this Section—and indeed, Murray’s
own life as a civil rights lawyer—might be described as constitutional
eschatology—as a belief in a latent purpose in America’s founding ideals,
paired with a commitment to bring about a kind of constitutional end of
history in which those purposes are finally fulfilled.
Returning for a moment to the Declaration: it has continued its grip on
Black American constitutional thought even to the present. Thus, political
theorist Danielle Allen’s discussion of her own relationship to the
Declaration of Independence represents a look back at the history of Black
Americans who have claimed the Declaration through their participation in
collective action to secure the realization of its values and their own
inclusion.170
In Professor Allen’s words, “I claim the Declaration as patrimony”—
with the word “claim” doing the lion’s share of work there, for, she goes on
to explain, she is the descendant of a slave, and readers may for that reason
look with skepticism on her claim: “Didn’t the Declaration defend the liberty
and equality only of white men of property?”171
She justifies her claiming not despite many of her ancestors not being
within the group of people contemplated by its authors, but indirectly
because of it. She cites her ancestors’ active participation in a struggle for
their own freedom—a grandfather’s involvement in founding an NAACP
chapter, her father’s decision to leave the South to avoid the omnipresent
prospect of Jim Crow violence, other ancestors’ involvement in the

168

SARAH AZARANSKY, THE DREAM IS FREEDOM: PAULI MURRAY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC
FAITH 16 (2011).
169 Id. at 16–17. The reference in the text to King is from Martin Luther King, Jr., Address Delivered
at Bishop Charles Mason Temple: I’ve Been to the Mountaintop (Apr. 3, 1968),
https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/ive-been-mountaintop-address-deliveredbishop-charles-mason-temple [https://perma.cc/F3JN-GDJL].
170 DANIELLE ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION: A READING OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN
DEFENSE OF EQUALITY 36–37 (2014).
171 Id. at 36.
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movement for women’s suffrage—as reflecting their “wanting to be free”—
the same desire represented by the text of the Declaration.172
Summing up, she punctuates her claim to the Declaration as patrimony
as follows: “Equality and freedom. Love of these ideas made my people.”173
In other words, it is her ancestors who claimed the Declaration for her,
through their attachment to the ideals it represented—even if the actual
society that it stood for failed to meet those ideals—and through their active
work to make that society more closely meet those ideals. Note also the
fruitful ambiguity in the term “my people,” which, it seems to me, can refer
both to Black Americans and to the entire demos—and implicitly, to the idea
that the Declaration and the love of freedom it reflects can unify those groups
in a shared identity rooted in that common value.
This is a good place to note that while this sentiment has been most
forcefully stated by Black Americans, as America’s original class of internal
excluded, it has also been articulated from a critical race standpoint more
generally. Professor Mari Matsuda, speaking from her perspective as a
Japanese-American, has expressed it in terms remarkably similar to
Professor Allen’s:
I can claim as my own the Constitution my father fought for at Anzio, the
Constitution that I swore to uphold and defend when I was admitted to the bar.
It was not written for me, but I can make it my own, using my chosen
consciousness as a woman and person of color to give substance to those
tantalizing words “equality” and “liberty.”174

2.

The Purified Constitution and the Continuing Need for
Political Action
Following the Civil War, as Professor Eric Foner has described, “the
national Constitution took its place alongside the Declaration of
Independence as a central reference point in black political discourse.”175
Smith’s prophecy was partly fulfilled: the Constitution was purified of much
of the taint of slavery, and so it could be permitted to stand on the same noble
plane as the Declaration. From another angle: Douglass had been proven
right that the Union could rein in the South and abolish slavery, the
Thirteenth Amendment was quickly rammed through, and it became easier
172

Id.
Id. at 37.
174 Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method,
11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7, 10 (1989); see also Melvin L. Rogers, David Walker and the Political Power
of the Appeal, 43 POL. THEORY 208 (2015) (reading David Walker’s Appeal to the Colored Citizens of
the World as a claim to citizenship on behalf of Black Americans on the basis of their capacity to
participate in a shared project of self-government).
175 Foner, supra note 79, at 880.
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for those with less vision than Douglass to see the potential in the
Constitution.
Other Black Americans promptly picked up some of Douglass’s key
points, particularly the claim that the Constitution had always contained in it
the latent promise of inclusion, and paired it with the recognition that this
promise must be actively seized by Black Americans. Thus, in 1865, the
Black citizens of Norfolk, Virginia, formed a committee which issued a
statement on their claims to suffrage by operation of law:
No sane person will for a moment contend that color or birth are recognized by
the Constitution of the United States as any bar to the acquisition or enjoyment
of citizenship. Further, the Congress of the Confederation expressly refused in
June, 1778, to permit the insertion of the word “white” in the fourth article of
Confederation, guaranteeing to the “free inhabitants” of each State, the
privileges and immunities of citizens, in all the States. Free people of color were
recognized voters in every State but South Carolina, at the time of the formation
of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore clearly formed part of the
“people” of the United States, who in the language of the preamble to the
Constitution “ordained and established” that Constitution. It follows, then, that
they are entitled to a full participation in all the benefits that Constitution was
ordained to confer, and, among others, to the inestimable blessings of “a
republican form of government,” guaranteed to the people of each State, by Sec.
4th, Art. IV of the Constitution. 176

In that passage, the Black citizens of Norfolk simultaneously claim
authorship of the Constitution—as “recognized voters” at the time of
ratification—and interpret it both to support their status as citizens and
members of We the People—notably, prior to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments—and to entitle them to the right to vote. Shortly thereafter,
they recognize that this right cannot be secured except by organized political
action:
In conclusion, we wish to advise our colored brethren of the State and nation,
that the settlement of this question is to a great extent dependent on them, and
that supineness on their part will do as much to delay if not defeat the full
recognition of their rights as the open opposition of avowed enemies. Then be
up and active, and everywhere let associations be formed having for their object
the agitation, discussion and enforcement of your claims to equality before the
law, and equal rights of suffrage. Your opponents are active; be prepared, and
organize to resist their efforts. We would further advise that all political
associations of colored men, formed within the limits of the State of Virginia,

176 NORFOLK COMMITTEE OF COLORED CITIZENS, EQUAL SUFFRAGE: ADDRESS FROM THE COLORED
CITIZENS OF NORFOLK, VA., TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 5–6 (1865),
https://www.loc.gov/item/09032794 [https://perma.cc/38YK-SV2K].
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should communicate the fact of their existence, with the names and post office
addresses of their officers, to Joseph T. Wilson, Norfolk, Va., in order that
communication and friendly cooperation may be kept up between the different
organizations, and facilities afforded for common and united State action,
should occasion require it.177

The message concludes with a declaration of their allegiance to the
United States: “We are Americans, we know no other country, we love the
land of our birth and our fathers . . . .”178
This retroactive reading continued into the turn of the century. In an
1899 speech decrying the growth of Jim Crow, author and activist Charles
Chesnutt casts the Constitution as always having contained the seeds of
racial equality and the Reconstruction Amendments as merely a clarification:
The Constitution of the United States proclaims in spirit if not in words, equality
before the law. Before the Civil War this was construed to apply to white men,
but the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments make it perfectly clear that it applies
to all white and colored men born or naturalized in the United States. The white
people of the South have declared, as they did once before to their sorrow, that
they are superior to the Constitution, and that the Negro shall not vote. 179

Yet Chesnutt, too, recognizes that this constitutional truth will be dead,
even in the courts, without collective action. From a speech five years later:
Our Supreme Court, in passing upon the disenfranchisement cases to which I
have referred, has said that the remedy for the conditions complained of in the
South, is political rather than judicial. I do not follow the distinction. Political
action can only result in the enactment of laws, which it is the province of
Courts to enforce. I think what the Supreme Court means to say is that its
function is to interpret and enforce the will of the people, and that it will not
enforce a law which, though approved when made, has since become
obnoxious. If this be true, then there remains but one method by which these
wrongs can be righted—the creation of a wholesome public opinion which will
demand political action.180

Chesnutt also adopted, following Douglass, the strategy of taking a
broad and moralized interpretation of the Constitution. In a 1908 speech, he
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Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
179 CHARLES W. CHESNUTT, Liberty and the Franchise (1899), in CHARLES W. CHESNUTT: ESSAYS
AND SPEECHES 101, 106 (Joseph R. McElrath, Jr. et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter CHESNUTT]; see also
CHARLES W. CHESNUTT, The Courts and the Negro (1908), in CHESNUTT (endorsing Justice Harlan’s
description of Dred Scott in the dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, where the latter alleges that Justice
Taney “virtually inserted a new clause in the Constitution,” and going on to describe it as a “narrow and
strained interpretation of the law”).
180 CHARLES W. CHESNUTT, The Race Problem, in CHESNUTT supra note 179, at 196, 201.
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notes that the Supreme Court interpreted the Reconstruction Amendments as
“not intended to wipe out distinctions of race,” but declares that (at least as
to legal distinctions) “[i]f they were not they ought to have been, and we
should plead for the larger interpretation; we should impress upon every
court that it is a court of conscience as well as a court of law.”181
Fast-forwarding a few decades, King echoed this sentiment in his Letter
from a Birmingham Jail, recognizing both that equal rights have been owed
to Black Americans since the Founding and even before (“three hundred and
forty years”), including under the Constitution, and yet that they cannot be
acquired except through action:
We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by
the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. Frankly, I have never yet
engaged in a direct action movement that was “well timed,” according to the
timetable of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of
segregation. For years now I have heard the words “Wait!” It rings in the ear of
every Negro with a piercing familiarity. This “Wait” has almost always meant
“Never.” It has been a tranquilizing thalidomide, relieving the emotional stress
for a moment, only to give birth to an ill-formed infant of frustration. We must
come to see with the distinguished jurist of yesterday that “justice too long
delayed is justice denied.” We have waited for more than three hundred and
forty years for our constitutional and God-given rights.182

3. Conditional Attachment to the Constitution
Let us for a moment return to Reconstruction. Congressman Joseph
Rainey was a freedman who was the first Black American to serve in the
House of Representatives. Speaking in 1871 in support of a bill to devote
federal efforts to fighting Ku Klux Klan terrorism, Congressman Rainey
nicely captured the idea of conditional allegiance. Should it achieve its
highest values—which, he argues, it can, rightly interpreted—then it’s
worthy of respect. If it does not, then it is fit only to be abandoned and
ignored. Rainey puts an “if” in front of Douglass: either the Constitution can
be read as Douglass would have it be read, or it has no value at all.
I take the ground that, in my opinion, lies far above the interpretation put upon
the provisions of the Constitution. I stand upon the broad plane of right; I look
to the urgent, the importunate demands of the present emergency; and while I
am far from advocating any step not in harmony with that sacred law of our
land, while I would not violate the lightest word of that chart which has so well
guided us in the past, yet I desire that so broad and liberal a construction be
181
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placed upon its provisions as will insure protection to the humblest citizen,
without regard to rank, creed, or color. Tell me nothing of a constitution which
fails to shelter beneath its rightful power the people of a country!
I believe when the fathers of our country framed the Constitution they made
the provisions so broad that the humblest, as well as the loftiest citizen, could
be protected in his inalienable rights. It was designed to be, and is, the bulwark
of freedom, and the strong tower of defense, against foreign invasion and
domestic violence. I desire to direct your attention to what is imbodied in the
preamble, and would observe that it was adopted after a liberal and protracted
discussion on every article composing the great American Magna Charta. And
like a keystone to an arch it made the work complete. . . . [Here, Rainey quotes
the Preamble.]
If the Constitution which we uphold and support as the fundamental law of
the United States is inadequate to afford security to life, liberty, and property—
if, I say, this inadequacy is proven, then its work is done, then it should no
longer be recognized as the Magna Charta of a great and free people; the sooner
it is set aside the better for the liberties of the nation.183

Douglass himself, a decade and a half later, expressed similar
sentiments upon observing the betrayal of Reconstruction in the South. Even
in the face of such treachery, he maintained his faith in the rights of the
Constitution and the constitutional capacity of the government to act but
noted that allegiance to that government is conditional on that action:
I know it is said that the general government is a government of limited powers.
It was also once said that the national government could not coerce a state and
it is generally said that this and that public measure is unconstitutional. But
whenever an administration has bad [sic] the will to do anything, it has generally
found Constitutional power to do it. If the general government had the power to
make black men citizens, it has the power to protect them in that citizenship. If
it had the right to make them voters it has the right to protect them in the exercise
of the elective franchise. If it has this right, and refuses to exercise it, it is a
traitor to the citizen. If it has not this right, it is destitute of the fundamental
quality of a government and ought to be hissed and hurried out of the sisterhood
of government, a usurper, a sham, a delusion and a snare.
On the other hand, if the fault is not in the structure of the government, but
in the treachery and indifference of those who administer it, the American
people owe it to themselves, owe it to the world, and to the Negro, to sweep
from place and power those who are thus derelict in the discharge of their place
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in the government who will not enforce the Constitutional right of every class
of American citizen.184

Douglass, like Purvis, wanted to believe that the fault is not in the
Constitution but in the corrupt people who are called upon to administer and
interpret it; the first strategy is to sweep them aside. If that fails—if the
Constitution itself genuinely is corrupt at bottom, then it simply does not
deserve attachment after all.185
This stance of conditional attachment persisted well into the late
twentieth century. Jamaican-American poet and activist June Jordan’s essay
Break the Law! expresses the same stance toward the law in the abstract.186
She begins by praising the laws establishing desegregation:
I had forgotten. Or I had never understood: The hotel had been forced to
desegregate, which meant the hotel had been forced to allow me to swim in that
pool. And, in response, the hotel was daring me to go ahead: Get into that murky
taboo cistern absolutely shunned, now, by white people.
They would boycott, they would forfeit, the summertime relief of swimming
rather than mingle their white bodies in the same element that held my own.
Until I stood in that unnatural dark of that unnatural stillness by that pool, I had
never felt white hatred so close, and everywhere, around me. Now I did. Now I
knew.
This was not an attitude or a preference. This was shotgun-serious loathing of
me and my kind.
The answer to that shotgun was the law.
You didn’t have to like it. You didn’t have to love me. But you did have to obey
the law and let me swim.

184 Frederick Douglass, I Denounce the So-Called Emancipation as a Stupendous Fraud (Apr. 16,
1888), in DOUGLASS, supra note 131, at 711, 720.
185 Du Bois took a more cynical path to the same idea. In a passage in Black Reconstruction, he goes
on a scornful excursus against “fetich-worship of the Constitution,” and declares there is “[n]o more
idiotic program” than to oblige it to be obeyed, at least if it were interpreted to forbid Reconstruction. Yet
even in the midst of this outpouring of anti-Constitutionalism, he cannot help but endorse Douglass’s
interpretation of its original anti-slavery character! “Certainly, no one could argue . . . that the
Constitution was a pro-slavery document. Yet, unconstitutionally, the South made it a pro-slavery
document . . . .” W. E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION: AN ESSAY TOWARD A HISTORY
OF THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, 1860–1880, at 336–37 (Russell & Russell 1963). Du Bois hardly accepts the Constitution here,
but he at least seems to imply that his rejection of it springs from the fact that it has been misread to do
things like permit slavery and forbid Reconstruction.
186 JUNE JORDAN, Break the Law!, in SOME OF US DID NOT DIE: NEW AND SELECTED ESSAYS OF
JUNE JORDAN 55, 55–56 (2002).
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Without the law on my side, I damn straight could not have traveled from New
York to Mississippi without horrible damage to my bladder, extreme
dehydration, and a variety of humiliating messages imprinted on my soul.
Without the law on my side, and after so long, I damn straight could not have
stayed in a downtown Jackson hotel/motel or rented a car at the airport, or
ordered a cup of coffee, anywhere, or exhibited the idiotic temerity of daring to
think about doing anything anywhere that didn’t say, COLORED.
That’s the before and after story of the shotgun and the law. That’s the before
and after story of white hatred of Black folks. Before, they just hated us. After,
they hated us or they didn’t hate us, but we were moving, now, moving lawfully,
see, into the same element that upheld their privileged white bodies. The same
water and the same air and, sooner or later, the same classroom, and the same
apartment building, and the same workplace, because we didn’t have some kind
of a dream about any of these things: We had the law equalizing our rights as
American citizens.187

Thus far, so good, the law—and, indeed, the Constitution, as it is the
Constitution that established the framework for desegregation and
authorized Congress to legislate to push it further—stands as the sole defense
for Black Americans against hate. But then Jordan turns to Proposition
209,188 which amended California’s Constitution to forbid affirmative action
in 1996. There, she stands against the law and calls upon the Chancellor of
the University of California to break it, to ensure the inclusion of Black
students in the metaphorical pool of University of California students.189 Like
Purvis, she invokes the constitutional People—very much including Black
people—as the ultimate authority to rectify this unjust, and illegitimate, law.
On behalf of We the People, she claims both the authority to reject a (state)
constitution licensing the educational exclusion of Black Americans and the
right to righteous lawbreaking in order to restore American constitutionalism
to its rightful position as the protector of Black Americans:
It was once against the law for Blackfolks to swim in indoor, or outdoor, public
waters.
We had to break those laws or agree to the slaveholder’s image of us: three
fifths of a human being.

187
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Proposition 209 Prohibition Against Discrimination or Preferential Treatment by State
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When the law is wrong, when the law produces and enjoins manifest and undue
injury to a people, when the law punishes one people and privileges another, it
is our moral obligation to break the law!
The law is not God-given!
2,100 minority students with straight-A, or better, grade point averages denied
admission to U.C.-Berkeley?!
To the Chancellors of the entire University of California system I say: Break
the law!
We, the people, we’ll take it from there. 190

4. Cynical Faith and Democratic Identity
The goal at which this tradition in Black American thought can be read
to aim is a rebuilding of American popular identity. This is expressed in
Langston Hughes’s poem Let America Be America Again.191
The poem begins by juxtaposing the valorized self-image of America
with reminders that this image has never been available to Black Americans:
Let America be America again.
Let it be the dream it used to be.
Let it be the pioneer on the plain
Seeking a home where he himself is free.
(America never was America to me.) 192

Yet, a few stanzas down, he claims, in solidarity with others who found
themselves on America’s shores, authorship of the American dream as a
parallel to the way that Black bodies built its wealth:
Yet I’m the one who dreamt our basic dream
In the Old World while still a serf of kings,
Who dreamt a dream so strong, so brave, so true,
That even yet its mighty daring sings
In every brick and stone, in every furrow turned
That’s made America the land it has become.
O, I’m the man who sailed those early seas
In search of what I meant to be my home —
For I’m the one who left dark Ireland’s shore,
And Poland’s plain, and England’s grassy lea,

190

Id. at 58.
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192 Id. at 189.
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And torn from Black Africa’s strand I came
To build a “homeland of the free.”193

That heritage, he claims a few more stanzas down, gives him a right to
build the real America, the America that fulfills its promise of freedom:
O, yes,
I say it plain,
America never was America to me,
And yet I swear this oath —
America will be!194

Novelist, essayist, and activist James Baldwin similarly describes the
“act of faith” that is represented by demanding Americans live up to their
own values and explains that it has the capacity to constitute, or reconstitute,
the American We the People which never properly existed:
This is not very different from the act of faith demanded by all those marches
and petitions while Martin was still alive. One could scarcely be deluded by
Americans anymore, one scarcely dared expect anything from the great, vast,
blank generality; and yet one was compelled to demand of Americans—and for
their sakes, after all—a generosity, a clarity, and a nobility which they did not
dream of demanding of themselves. Part of the error was irreducible, in that the
marchers and petitioners were forced to suppose the existence of an entity
which, when the chips were down, could not be located—i.e., there are no
American people yet: but to this speculation (or desperate hope) we shall
presently return.195

As promised, he later fills out the notion of bringing into being the
American people, expressing it as a kind of inclusive confrontation, forged
in social action:
The black and white confrontation, whether it be hostile, as in the cities and the
labor unions, or with the intention of forming a common front and creating the
foundations of a new society, as with the students and the radicals, is obviously
crucial, containing the shape of the American future and the only potential of a
193 Id. at 190–91. Cf. Frederick Douglass, The Free Negro’s Place Is in America, Speech Delivered
at National Convention of Liberty Party, Buffalo, New York (Sept. 18, 1851), in DOUGLASS, supra note
131, at 176–77 (“I believe that simultaneously with the landing of the Pilgrims, there landed slaves on
the shores of this continent, and that for two hundred and thirty years and more we have had a foothold
on this continent. We have grown up with you; we have watered your soil with our tears; nourished it
with our blood, tilled it with our hard hands. Why should we not stay here? We came when it was a
wilderness, and were the pioneers of civilization on this continent. We levelled your forests; our hands
removed the stumps from your fields, and raised the first crops and brought the first produce to your
tables. We have been with you, are still with you, have been with you in adversity, and by the help of
God will be with you in prosperity.”).
194 HUGHES, supra note 191, at 191.
195 JAMES BALDWIN, NO NAME IN THE STREET 10 (First Vintage Int’l ed. 2007).
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truly valid American identity. No one knows precisely how identities are
forged, but it is safe to say that identities are not invented: an identity would
seem to be arrived at by the way in which the person faces and uses his
experience. It is a long drawn-out and somewhat bewildering and awkward
process.196

Professor Turner finds similar ideas in the work of Ralph Ellison,
arguing that Ellison’s work called for the creation of a shared American
identity incorporating Black Americans, one that offers a new, democratic
identity to both White and Black citizens. This identity requires that Whites
be educated in the injustice of their society.197
For Baldwin, this rebuilding comes from the love of Black Americans
for a society of which they understand themselves as members, despite
persistent exclusion:
To be an Afro-American, or an American black, is to be in the situation,
intolerably exaggerated, of all those who have ever found themselves part of a
civilization which they could in no wise honorably defend—which they were
compelled, indeed, endlessly to attack and condemn—and who yet spoke out of
the most passionate love, hoping to make the kingdom new, to make it
honorable and worthy of life. Whoever is part of whatever civilization
helplessly loves some aspects of it, and some of the people in it. A person does
not lightly elect to oppose his society. One would much rather be at home
among one’s compatriots than be mocked and detested by them. And there is a
level on which the mockery of the people, even their hatred, is moving because
it is so blind: it is terrible to watch people cling to their captivity and insist on
their own destruction. I think black people have always felt this about America,
and Americans, and have always seen, spinning above the thoughtless
American head, the shape of the wrath to come. 198

What clearer explication can there be of cynical faith? In essence, it is
to hold out hope in the possibility of rebuilding, while seeing the doom and
destruction looming over the broken, never achieved, yet paradoxically
beloved demos.199
This cynical faith remains today and has been forcefully articulated by
one of the founders of Critical Race Studies. Professor Patricia Williams has
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Id. at 189.
Turner, supra note 76, at 668–70.
198 BALDWIN, supra note 195, at 194.
199 Note also the double-identity that Baldwin assumes, simultaneously describing Black Americans
as “part of [American] civilization,” yet at the same time adopting an outsider perspective from which
they can see the doom which Americans are “thoughtless” about—the same insider-outsider perspective
Douglass adopts. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
197
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given us the most eloquent modern articulation of that faith and its capacity
to serve as a creative force in constitutional rebuilding:
To say that blacks never fully believed in rights is true; yet it is also true that
blacks believed in them so much and so hard that we gave them life where there
was none before. We held onto them, put the hope of them into our wombs, and
mothered them—not just the notion of them. We nurtured rights and gave rights
life. And this was not the dry process of reification, from which life is drained
and reality fades as the cement of conceptual determinism hardens round—but
its opposite. This was the resurrection of life from 400-year-old ashes; the
parthenogenesis of unfertilized hope.200

Professor Williams further explains the dependency of this kind of faith
on the possibility of finding its warrant in ideas that are actually present in
one’s constitutional institutions:
But if it took this long to breathe life into a form whose shape had already been
forged by society and which is therefore idealistically if not ideologically
accessible, imagine how long would be the struggle without even that sense of
definition, without the power of that familiar vision. What hope would there be
if the assignment were to pour hope into a timeless, formless futurism? 201

The task of the activist, in her terms, is to first “unmask the sorcerer”—
reveal the fraudulent claims of existing social institutions—but then “the
mask had to be donned by the acquiring shaman, and put to good ends” to
force them into their true and worthy form.202
Williams herself does not name this approach “faith.” I take that label
for Williams’s account from Professors Derrick Bell and Preeta Bansal, who
describe both Williams’s articulation and, implicitly, Douglass’s as follows:
“Recognizing that constitutional rights have never translated into literal
mandate for white leaders responding to black demands for equality, blacks
nevertheless have clung to the Constitution as an embodiment of the ideals
of freedom and equality for all . . . .”203
Bell and Bansal interpret Williams in the context of commenting on
Professor Michelman. Ultimately, they reluctantly and skeptically endorse
Michelman’s version of the constitutional conception, but only as a matter
of faith. Indeed, they read Michelman to share this cynical faith, and to be
willing “like generations of black Americans . . . to sift through the ashes of
200

Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 401, 430 (1987).
201 Id.
202 Id. at 431–32.
203 Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609,
1619 (1988). Bell describes this general faith in justice among Black activists elsewhere. DERRICK BELL,
FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM, at xiii–xiv (1992).
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our political and jurisprudential past for remnants of what might have been
and, in his view, what might yet be.”204 Bell and Bansal also argue, as I have
in this Article, that the constitutional conception must fail if Black
Americans are not included—that, “the oppression of blacks does not
oppress blacks alone, but, indeed, . . . it denies all of humanity the full
emancipatory potential of critical, dialogic self-rule.”205
Professor Dorothy Roberts has further explored the “cynical” side of
cynical faith, offering as an example of “cynical legalism” “the Black
Panthers’ practice of surrounding police while they arrested a black man,
demanding, law books in hand, that the ‘pigs’ abide by the letter of the
law.”206 This is cynicism, Roberts suggests, for the same reason that Black
constitutional fidelity can be cynical—because the Panthers knew that the
pigs would not actually follow the law.
We might say the same about Douglass—he knew that the slaveocracy
would not follow the Constitution, at least not until they were forced to do
so at gunpoint. The Panthers, of course, carried guns too. In one hand, the
claim of Constitutional rights; in the other, the desperate resort to force.207
Professor Roberts denies that faith is the appropriate way to describe
this stance toward the U.S. Constitution, characterizing it instead as a
“faithfulness” that is cashed out “by relentlessly demanding that its
interpretation live up to its highest principles and follow its strictest
requirements.”208 Here, I disagree with Professor Roberts. Why did the
Panthers wield their law books in addition to their guns, if they did not hold
out some faith, or at least hope, that the former had some force?
Professor Mari Matsuda has identified this dual stance toward law as a
feature of outsider jurisprudence, more generally, and as an instance of Du
Bois-like double consciousness—the capacity both to recognize the meaning
of the law and its corruption. She highlights the courtroom self-defense of
Angela Davis as its highest practical instantiation:
204

Bell & Bansal, supra note 203, at 1620.
Id.
206 Dorothy E. Roberts, The Meaning of Blacks’ Fidelity to the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1761, 1768 (1997).
207 Malcolm X at least once made a similar suggestion to a Cleveland audience in 1964—that violent
resistance was acceptable for Black Americans when specifically paired with a confident claim of legal
right:
205

Any time you know you’re within the law, within your legal rights, within your moral rights, in
accord with justice, then die for what you believe in. But don’t die alone. Let your dying be
reciprocal. This is what is meant by equality. What is good for the goose is good for the gander.
BROMELL, supra note 130, at 122–23 (quoting MALCOLM X, The Ballot or the Bullet, in MALCOLM X
SPEAKS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS 23, 34 (George Brietman ed., 1965)).
208 Roberts, supra note 206, at 1768.
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There are times to stand outside the courtroom door and say “this procedure is
a farce, the legal system is corrupt, justice will never prevail in this land as long
as privilege rules in the courtroom.” There are times to stand inside the
courtroom and say “this is a nation of laws, laws recognizing fundamental
values of rights, equality and personhood.” Sometimes, as Angela Davis did,
there is a need to make both speeches in one day. Is that crazy? Inconsistent?
Not to Professor Davis, a Black woman on trial for her life in racist America. It
made perfect sense to her, and to the twelve jurors good and true who heard her
when she said “your government lies, but your law is above such lies.”209

Pauli Murray captures this double consciousness in a stanza in her
famous poem Dark Testament and ascribes it to the country itself, conscious
both of its highest aspirations and its cruelest injustices:
This is our portion, this is our testament,
This is America, dual-brained creature,
One hand thrusting us out to the stars,
One hand shoving us down in the gutter.
....
Put it all down in a time capsule,
Bury it deep in the soil of Virginia,
Bury slave-song with the Constitution,
Bury it in that vineyard of planters
And poll-taxers, sharecroppers and Presidents.
In coffin and outhouse all men are equal,
And the same red earth is fed
By the white bones of Tom Jefferson
And the white bones of Nat Turner.210

209

Matsuda, supra note 174, at 8; see also Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 334–35 (1987) (further discussing the
Douglass tradition of constitutional interpretation and how it was reflected in King’s later work). This
dual consciousness may be a characteristic feature of contemporary critical race theory. See Angela P.
Harris, Forward: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 741, 743 (1994)
(characterizing the enterprise of critical race theory as combining a critical approach to American law
with a “vision of liberation,” a dynamic tension between “radical critique and racial emancipation”); see
also Nick Bromell, A “Voice from the Enslaved”: The Origins of Frederick Douglass’s Political
Philosophy of Democracy, 23 AM. LITERARY HIST. 697, 711 (2011) (suggesting that “the ability to
manage contraries” is “a hallmark . . . of the African-American tradition of political thought” and arguing
that Douglass’s constitutional theory is an example of this ability).
210 PAULI MURRAY, DARK TESTAMENT AND OTHER POEMS 24–25 (1970). Nat Turner was the leader
of a dramatic (and bloody) 1831 slave rebellion in Virginia. See generally Justin Fornal, Nat Turner’s
Slave Uprising Left Complex Legacy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 5, 2016), https://news.
nationalgeographic.com/2016/10/nat-turner-slave-rebellion-legacy [https://perma.cc/6ZDV-VMZH]. I
read the association between slave-song and the Constitution and between Jefferson and Turner to be a
suggestion that slave rebellion was part of the tradition of the American Revolution. Cf. FREDERICK
DOUGLASS, LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 129–130 (1882) (“The morality of free society
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This cynical faith seems to me to be the natural attitude of those
engaged in claimant critique. Exclusion from the social order being critiqued
gives the critic fair grounds for cynicism. At the same time, the aspiration to
do something akin to internal critique, and the commitment to bring it about
with collective action, to stand in the place of a participant in the scheme of
value articulated by that social order, presupposes a kind of faith in that
scheme of value.211
Williams fills out part of the basis for this faith in terms that harken to
Douglass as well as to the constitutional patriots: because the Constitution
offers itself up as a suitable place for these ambitions to be projected, “there
is the spirit of the law, the symbology of freedom, which is in some ways
utterly meaningless and empty—although at the same time this very
emptiness provides a vessel to be filled with a sense of possibility, with a
plurality of autonomous yearnings.”212
Ultimately, Williams, like Baldwin, understands the experience of
rights-claiming for Black Americans as the development of a social identity
as well as a fully integrated individual identity:
Blacks, however, may symbolize the King Lear who was pushed to the point of
madness, who did not find his essential humanity while retaining some
reference point to an identity as social being temporarily lost in the wilderness,
but who ultimately lost everything, including a sense of self. The black slave
experience was that of lost languages, cultures, tribal ties, kinship bonds, and
even of the power to procreate in the image of oneself and not that of an alien
master. That sort of confrontation with the utter powerlessness of status which
is the true and full condition of the wilderness is what ultimately drove King
Lear from insight into madness. Reduced to the basic provisions of food, water
and a straw pallet, kings may gain new, perhaps profound, insight into those
needs they share with all humankind. For others, however—for slaves,
sharecroppers, prisoners and mental patients—the experience of poverty and
need is fraught with the realization that they are dependent “on the uncertain
and fitful protection of a world conscience” which has forgotten them as
individuals, a collective mind which considers them (if it considers them at all)

could have no application to slave society. Slaveholders made it almost impossible for the slave to commit
any crime, known either to the laws of God or to the laws of man. If he stole, he but took his own; if he
killed his master, he only imitated the heroes of the revolution.”).
211 Professor Bromell casts a similar idea in religious tones, suggesting that Martin Luther King, Jr.
and Malcolm X had a (religious) “faith-as-tension [which] was caused by a conflict between their belief
that a moral order had conferred this meaning on black suffering and would ultimately end it, and their
very strong doubts that any moral order worthy of the name would have permitted such suffering in the
first place.” BROMELL, supra note 130, at 124. Swap out a religious “moral order” for a secular
“constitution” and you have cynical faith in the legalistic context.
212 Patricia J. Williams, Commercial Rights and Constitutional Wrongs, 49 MD. L. REV. 293, 294
(1990).
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“examples of the universal abstraction Man.” For the historically
disempowered, the conferring of rights is symbolic of all the denied aspects of
humanity: rights imply a respect which places one within the referential range
of self and others, which elevates one’s status from human body to social being.
For blacks, then, the attainment of rights signifies the due, the respectful
behavior, the collective responsibility properly owed by a society to one of its
own.213

Williams moreover, in her discussion of the Black experience with
claiming rights to inclusion, quotes a passage from French philosopher Paul
Ricœur about how “human deeds are also waiting for fresh interpretations
which decide their meaning” and “opened to this kind of practical
interpretation through present praxis.”214 I read her to mean that this kind of
rights-claiming as action can be retroactively incorporated into the
Constitution itself through something like Professor Benhabib’s
jurisgenerative politics. That is, because of the results of Black collective
action, the claimed rights are inserted back into the will of a collective
sovereign interpreting its own constitutional institutions. Black collective
rights-claiming reaches back through history and changes the Constitution.
In Douglass’s words: “If the South has made the Constitution bend to the
purposes of slavery, let the North now make that instrument bend to the cause
of freedom and justice.”215
Going further, Williams, this time via a quote from Carl Jung,
analogizes the incorporation of Black Americans into White society with an
explicitly retroactive characterization of the integration of an individual
identity:
Conscious realization or the bringing together of the scattered parts is in one
sense an act of the ego’s will, but in another sense it is a spontaneous
manifestation of the self, which was always there. Individuation appears, on the
one hand, as the synthesis of a new unity which previously consisted of
scattered particles, and on the other hand, as the revelation of something which
existed before the ego and is in fact its father or creator and is also its totality. 216

213

Williams, supra note 200, at 415–16.
Id. at 426 (quoting Paul Ricœur, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: ESSAYS ON
LANGUAGE, ACTION AND INTERPRETATION 208 (John B. Thompson ed. & trans., 1981)).
215 DOUGLASS, The Constitution of the United States, supra note 132, at 389.
216 Williams, supra note 200, at 429–30 (quoting CARL JUNG, Transformation Symbolism in the
Mass, in PSYCHE AND SYMBOL: A SELECTION FROM THE WRITINGS OF C.G. JUNG 148, 214 (Violet S. de
Laszlo ed., 1958)). I think that the two concepts of double-consciousness and of fractured identity as a
product of constitutional and democratic exclusion are particularly important ideas that are intellectually
reachable only from the standpoint of the socially subordinated. Balkin analyzes Douglass’s
constitutional abolitionism as a key example in his own theory of constitutional redemption. JACK
BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 47, 112–13, 122–23
214
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Thus, finally, in Williams, we see a full integration of the stance toward
the Constitution that I have drawn out in this Section. Black Americans, by
collectively laying claim to the rights latent in the Constitution, can reveal
and retroactively bring into being the People that make the Constitution real.
Through a kind of Hegelian historical learning process, the American people
comes to realize its own freedom.217 The Constitution-giving We the People
plays the role of Spirit in this Hegelian comparison and is paradoxically both
actual and actualizing. Actual, because the purported people articulated the
constitutional values that provide the germ of their proper realization, and
actualizing, because it requires action on the basis of Black claims to
membership before the demos can truly come into being.
Let us pause here to bring the discussion back to the previous Part.
Professor Habermas has argued that a constitution can serve as the basis for
a project of cross-generational social learning which allows us to avoid the
dilemma of constituent power by treating the constitution as simultaneously

(2011). At a high level, the argument in this Article is greatly in accord with Balkin’s. But what Balkin
misses, it seems to me, is just this combination of double consciousness and identity fracture in both the
polity and in the individual. Reading Douglass with double consciousness in mind allows us to see that
his words do not merely represent faith in the abolitionist reading of the Constitution, nor do they merely
represent political rhetoric—and they do not even represent a simple conjunction of the two, in which his
rhetoric was informed by faith in the potential truth of his words. I think for Douglass there was a genuine
contradiction between the idea of the American Constitution and the practice of American
constitutionalism, and a contradiction he took fully on board—he could understand the Constitution as
legitimate and illegitimate, as representing values worth striving for and the betrayal of those values, just
as in his Fourth of July speech, as discussed supra note 131, he simultaneously represented himself
as citizen and non-citizen. The contradictions in Douglass’s own identity as citizen and non-citizen reflect
the contradictions in the identity of the demos which claimed authority over Douglass but denied that he
was a member of it. These contradictions are the consequence of the fact that the social and legal
world in which Douglass, and all Black Americans, have been embedded has sent these mixed
messages—the institutional basis for understanding Black Americans as included and as excluded were
always both available.
Thus, it was not simply the case that the Constitution had been used to do evil things, but that faith in
the democratic process and in the human capacity to achieve the values that the Constitution expresses
allowed someone in Douglass’s position to see it as legitimate. Rather, there is a degree of constitutional
evil beyond which the Constitution does not even exist in a coherent sense because a Constitution that
denies its own demos lacks authority in the first place. There was, as Baldwin, supra note 195, suggested,
no such thing as an American people, and hence no Constitution for them to have made; the only way to
even believe in such a thing as an American Constitution at all, as a Black American in 1860, would be
to identify a state of affairs, even if that state of affairs had to be located in the future, in which one could
say that the Constitution was genuinely established under the authority of a demos including Black people.
Yet at the same time, the Constitution did exist, and the American people did exist—the institutions that
enslaved Douglass were not just imaginary. The only way to make any sense of it at all is to be able to
live with the paradox and strive for the solution—the reconstitution of the demos—that resolves it.
217 See generally Daniel Little, Philosophy of History, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward Zalta ed., Summer 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/history
[https://perma.cc/4JVK-9V6M] (describing Hegel’s philosophy of history as the self-discovery of human
freedom).
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an ongoing product of and producer of the demos.218 In slightly different
forms, this is the idea that Professors Benhabib and Michelman have
described as a “jurisgenerative” capacity.219 However, I have argued that
constitutions lack this jurisgenerative capacity to the extent they are
characterized by persistent illegitimate exclusion. For that reason, the
American Constitution in particular cannot fulfill the law-legitimating and
demos-creating ambitions of the constitutional conception.
And that’s where Douglass and his intellectual heirs come in. Black
Americans can, and have, participated in the ongoing production of the
American Constitution despite the best efforts of the forces of white
supremacy. If the demos ever becomes whole—if it ever fully includes Black
Americans (and the others who have been unjustly excluded)—that inclusion
will be a product of the efforts of Black (and other) activists who have
demanded over centuries that America live up to the value claims its
founding documents have made. Should that happy day ever come, we will
be able to genuinely say that the Constitution and the now-completed demos
have co-created one another, and the Constitution will, finally, be legitimate.
D. A Note in Defense of the Ever-Living Now
It might be objected that Douglass’s constitutional reading, and my
conception of wrongful exclusion, are ahistorical. Worse, to a historian, all
this talk about retroactive revision of the demos and Hegelian anachronism
might be rather alarming. After all, one might argue, those who were
included in the eighteenth century, apart from abolitionists, thought that the
exclusion of slaves (and women, and Native Americans) was consistent with
popular sovereignty as they understood it. So while I may be able to say that
exclusion was wrong in an absolute moral sense, obviously, and also wrong
from the standpoint of the enslaved, can I really say that the United States
lacked popular sovereignty from the standpoint of white men?220 Similarly,
can Douglass really dismiss the originalist reading of the constitution as a
legislative act? Why not just say that we ought to amend the Constitution
going forward—either through Article Five or through Ackermanian
nontextual interpretation—while acknowledging its legitimacy from the
standpoint of the (White) generations who framed it in the past?
That is, if the United States did not lack popular sovereignty from the
standpoint of White men, then we can perhaps represent the United States as
a democracy that simply happened to engage in some human rights

218
219
220

See Habermas, supra note 35, at 774–75.
See BENHABIB, supra note 122, at 181; Michelman, supra note 122, at 1502.
I thank Sarah Seo for raising this worry.
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violations with respect to foreigners (representing both Native Americans
and enslaved people from Africa, as well as their descendants, as foreigners).
On that conception, the United States at the Founding was an evil democracy,
to be sure, but no less a democracy—and its treatment of slaves might be
analogous to the Athenian genocide in Melos that Thucydides recounts—
terrible, but not inconsistent with popular sovereignty of the wrongdoer.221
On that reading, perhaps the United States did not violate its constitutional
commitments, from the start, it is just that those commitments came to
change over time.
I reject such a reading of Constitutional history. On the contrary, I claim
that even the included, indeed, even the evildoers, at least sometimes
recognized the fundamental incompatibility between slavery and the ideals
of the Constitution. Consider the following, from a speech of Alexander
Stephens, the Vice President of the Confederacy:
The new Constitution has put at rest forever all the agitating questions relating
to our peculiar institutions—African slavery as it exists among us—the proper
status of the [N]egro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause
of the late rupture and present revolution. Jefferson, in his forecast, had
anticipated this as the ‘rock upon which the old union would split.’ He was
right. What was conjecture with him is now a realized fact. But whether he fully
comprehended the great truth upon which that rock stood and stands may be
doubted. The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most of the leading
statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Constitution, were that the
enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was
wrong in principle, socially, morally and politically. It was an evil they knew
not well how to deal with, but the general opinion of the men of that day was,
that somehow or other, in the order of Providence, the institution would be
evanescent and pass away . . . . Those ideas, however, were fundamentally
wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an
error. It was a sandy foundation, and the idea of a government built upon it;
when the ‘storm came and the winds blew, it fell.’ Our new government is
founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone
rests upon the great truth that the Negro is not equal to the white man. That
slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal

221 THUCYDIDES, THE LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR 350–57 (Robert B. Strassler ed., rev. 1996) (describing Athenian genocide in
Melos). Even on this account, it seems hard to say what to do with the exclusion of women, but at least
women were not at the time subjected to genocide or enslavement like Native Americans and Black
Americans (for whatever small comfort that may offer).
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condition. This, our new government, is the first in the history of the world,
based upon this great physical and moral truth.222

If even a Confederate leader can understand the Constitution (of the
Union) as rooted in “the assumption of the equality of the races,” then how
can that Constitution be read to permit the subordination of Black Americans
from the get-go, except in terms of illegitimate hypocrisy?223
Even if it is ahistorical, a kind of ahistorical approach is, I’ll submit, the
right way to read the Constitution. Let’s take Professors Ackerman,
Benhabib, and Habermas seriously, and suppose that the Constitution can
extend across time and have its meaning developed across generations. Then
Professor Williams’s conception of the demos, and those of Baldwin and
Douglass, count just as much as the conception of the people who happened
to be around at the end of the eighteenth century, for each generation has its
part in developing the shared cross-generational constitutional identity.
Jurisgenerative politics has to be at least a little bit retroactive.
Douglass himself expressed the spirit of this intergenerational
conversation and the project of describing the bounds of We the People
without deference to its historical exclusions in his Fourth of July speech.
Rejecting the notion that the American people of his generation could rest
on the heroic laurels of the founders who won their freedom from George
III, he declared:
My business, if I have any here to-day, is with the present. The accepted time
with God and His cause is the ever-living now . . . . We have to do with the past
only as we can make it useful to the present and to the future. To all inspiring
motives, to noble deeds which can be gained from the past, we are welcome.
But now is the time, the important time. Your fathers have lived, died, and have
done their work, and have done much of it well. You live and must die, and you
must do your work. You have no right to enjoy a child’s share in the labor of
your fathers, unless your children are to be blest by your labors. 224

These words apply just as well to constitutional theory. It is our
interpretive labors which give meaning to the constitutional tradition handed
down from prior generations. Every day we are obliged to ask whether
American constitutional institutions are legitimate now? If not, can we justify
an attachment to them based on the prospect of making them legitimate in
222 DU BOIS, supra note 185, at 49–50 (citing LUCY SHELTON STEWART, THE REWARD OF
PATRIOTISM 41–42 (1930)) (emphasis omitted).
223 Relatedly, Professor Wilson J. Moses credits Douglass with the view, “common to his
generation,” that Jefferson was an abolitionist but that the cotton gin undermined the progress of this
view. Wilson J. Moses, “The Ever-Present Now”: Frederick Douglass’s Pragmatic Constitutionalism,
99 J. AFR. AM. HIST. 71, 82 (2014).
224 DOUGLASS, The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro, supra note 131, at 193.
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the future? The founding can help us answer those questions only insofar as
the people who have a right to ask them, right here and now, share some
affinity with the people of 1788 such that their choices ought to be
meaningful to us. Thus, the Us of now, the We the People who today
collectively recognize one another as the constituency of the Constitution—
or who aspire to do so and aspire to be so recognized—must seek that affinity
as we define ourselves, not as the founders would have defined us.
CONCLUSION: BLACK CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM:
“CHANGE THE JOKE AND SLIP THE YOKE”
The line of thought stretching from Douglass to Williams can redeem
the constitutional conception by illustrating the capacity of a constitution to
be a resource even in conditions of persistent exclusion.
One of the consistent themes of the Douglass line of thought is that the
Constitution can be claimed through action and through, as Allen says, love
of the fundamental values of freedom and equality. This is something that
Black Americans have been doing for a very long time. Consider the 180,000
Black Americans who served in the Union Army in the Civil War, and how
they were instrumental in the victory that led to the Reconstruction
Amendments.225 This act of claiming was also an act of authorship, partly on
the basis of an attachment to the ideas written into America’s Founding
documents. That act of authorship fits nicely into the constitutional
conception: the blood of Black Civil War soldiers, the sweat of Black civil
rights activists, the tears of #BlackLivesMatter activists, all have come
attached to an appeal to foundational American values and to the
Constitution that declares them. These acts are forms of participation in the
intergenerational conversation described by Professors Habermas and
Ackerman.
The only reason those acts of Black American authorship cannot
currently serve as elements in a triumphalist story of jurisgenerative
politics—in which Black Americans secured their own inclusion, and, with
it, the legitimacy of the American constitution—is that they were betrayed.
The authorial acts of the Civil War and Reconstruction and the Civil Rights
Movement did not fully transform the Constitution, due to the unwillingness
of White Americans to participate in the project of rebuilding We the People.
The act of building a genuinely shared demos requires participation from the
community as a whole, but rather than accept the invitation issued by these
acts of authorship to join in co-creating a Constitution properly built on the
ideals expressed by the Founders, White Americans responded with Klan
225
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terror and Jim Crow and mass incarceration. To be sure, there were moments
of cross-racial solidarity—for example, the election of Barack Obama as the
nation’s first Black president must have at least symbolic importance, for he
needed to win many votes from non-Black Americans to get there. But then
the pattern of backlash repeated, as he was replaced by the man who spread
a conspiracy theory about Obama being born in Kenya226 and took out full
page New York Times advertisements to kick off calls for the execution of
five innocent Black men in New York City227—a replacement facilitated by
voter suppression which was permitted by the Supreme Court’s evisceration
of the signature legislative achievement of the Civil Rights Movement.228
The rebuilding of the demos just never seems to stick.
Professor Charles R. Lawrence III has explained how even this cycle of
repeated gain and backlash can be integrated into the building of a
movement, and, with it, a demos:
When people’s movements successfully challenge and disrupt racist structures
and institutions, and contest the narratives of racial subordination, the
plunderers will respond with new law. The new laws will inflict new forms of
violence and compose new narratives to make the new violence seem just. This
does not mean that there is never progress, that the people’s movements have
not achieved real transformation. The transmutation of transformative change
into re-enactment of subordination through quasi-reform is a constant threat.
Those who would judge race reform law must recognize when law affirmatively
moves society toward transformation and when it resists transformation by
inflicting new forms of violence and justificatory narratives. The importance of
race reform law is found not so much in the rights guaranteed and enforced by

226 Domenico Montanaro, Without Apology, Trump Now Says: ‘Obama Was Born In’ the U.S., NPR
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/09/16/494231757/without-apology-trump-now-says-obamawas-born-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/V8HD-5V7A]; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER
(May 18, 2012, 12:31 PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/203568571148800001?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/PY5Q-NCRE] (“Let’s take a closer look at that birth certificate. @BarackObama was
described in 2003 as being ‘born in Kenya.’”); see also Katie Rogers and Nicholas Fandos, Trump Tells
Congresswomen to “Go Back” to the Countries They Came From, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/14/us/politics/trump-twitter-squad-congress.html
[https://perma.cc/M5M2-LSSQ] (recounting events where President suggested that group of
Congresswomen, unnamed but widely understood, among others, Black native-born Congresswoman
Ayanna S. Pressley, to “go back” to their home countries). Cf. SINGH, supra note 76, at 21–22 (noting
history of treating Black Americans, along with immigrants and other subordinated groups, as the
excluded other against which American identity is defined).
227 Jan Ransom, Trump Will Not Apologize for Calling for Death Penalty over Central Park Five,
N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/nyregion/central-park-fivetrump.html [https://perma.cc/43YT-4KPD].
228 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
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the state, as in how that law reflects our reconception of ourselves as a people
who have participated in our own and our nation’s transformation. 229

In other words, the activity of Constitutional rebuilding, however
incompletely achieved, is the point, for it is that rebuilding process that
builds the people. I choose to aggressively read Lawrence and the ambiguity
of the “ourselves” and “a people” in his last sentence to suppose both that it
builds long-run capacity in Black Americans to exercise authorship, and that
it builds the composite American demos up to be closer to the kind of demos
that can genuinely exercise popular authorship.
Ralph Ellison provided an evocative description of this process of
imaginative democracy-rebuilding in a review of Howard Zinn’s The
Southern Mystique:
Negroes also know . . . that you prepare yourself for desegregation and the
opportunities to be released thereby before that freedom actually exists. Indeed,
it is in the process of preparation for an elected role that the techniques of
freedom are discovered and that freedom itself is released.
The Negro Freedom Party of Mississippi, for instance, arose out of a mock
political action, and as a mockery of the fraudulent democracy of the
Democratic party of Mississippi. Its mockery took the form of developing
techniques for teaching Negroes denied the right to vote how to form a political
party and participate in the elective process. In the beginning it possessed all of
the “artificiality” of a ritual, but the events, the “drama” acted out in Atlantic
City, saw the transformation of their mockery and play-acting into a significant
political gesture that plunged them into the realms of conscious history. Here
the old slave proverb “Change the joke and slip the yoke” proved a lasting bit
of wisdom. For Negroes, the Supreme Court Decision of 1954 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 induced no sudden transformation of character; it provided
the stage upon which they could reveal themselves for what their experiences
have made them and for what they have made of their experiences. Here the
past and the present come together, making possible a collaboration, across the
years, between the old abolitionists and such contemporary activists as Howard
Zinn. Nor should we forget that today Negroes are freeing themselves. 230

That passage really sums up the whole thing—cynical faith, the process
of actively building democracy through struggle, where the struggle itself
comes to constitute the democracy, and the way in which this struggle and
learning fills out the intergenerational conversation imagined by
constitutional conception theorists such as Professors Ackerman and
Habermas. Even mockery—whether mockery of the Jim Crow Democratic
229 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Fire This Time: Black Lives Matter, Abolitionist Pedagogy and the
Law, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 381, 387 (2015).
230 RALPH ELLISON, GOING TO THE TERRITORY 102–03 (1986).
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Party or the mockery that the original Constitution claims to speak for “We
the People”—can come to life through an intergenerational process of
experience and activism. And it even expresses the sense of destiny that has
run through so much of Black constitutional thought—from Ellison’s
reference to “an elected role,” clearly referring to the idea of a people chosen
for that role by providence, not by the voters, to James McCune Smith’s
vision of Black Americans as the destined saviors of American constitutional
democracy.
Thus, the line of thought spanning Douglass, and Lawrence, and
Ellison, counsels activists for freedom and equality—for inclusion—to keep
going. It counsels activists to recognize the victories that have been won, and
the way that these victories—though they do not amount to full inclusion—
nonetheless have further built the normative foundation of the Constitution.
The Habermasian learning process has begun, albeit how Douglass expected
it to begin—agonistically, with action and conflict—rather than the
rationalistic discursive process Professor Habermas likes to imagine. And
though the learning is far from complete, the result of what the nascent demos
has learned so far, in the course of its struggle to come into being, has been
a progressive strengthening of the kinds of moral claims that America’s
constitution warrants and permits to be converted into legal claims. No
matter what the Supreme Court does in the next few years, no matter how
many civil rights it manages to strike down, so long as America’s
constitutional text and history are remembered, lawyers and activists will
always be able to point to the clearer articulation of the principles of freedom
and equality that Black soldiers helped write into the Constitution, and, to
the history of antidiscrimination law and affirmative inclusion that Black
activists helped write into its interpretative principles—even if only for a
time. And in the next round, those claims will still be stronger—Douglass’s
“abolition statesmen” will have more to work with.
The Douglass line of thought ultimately becomes an expansion of the
constitutional conception. Even though there isn’t a genuine We the People,
those of us who would build it up have good reason to create a constitutional
culture—to press the state to adhere to the promises latent in the
Constitution, to build and support individual and collective commitments to
its values—in order that this culture may educate those who are not currently
faithful to its values (although they may believe they are). Rather than
Habermasian discourse, this Constitution, the Constitution that is and is yet
to be, reveals itself to all of its nascent people through struggles over its
realization. And if it is finally realized—or at least as it makes halting steps
toward realization, the Douglass line of thought grants it retroactive validity
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by recognizing that the demos built by this realization really was already
there—albeit latently—to validate it all along.
From another direction, Black constitutional patriotism can be seen as
a recipe for reconciliation. Reconciliation is a term of art in political
philosophy in a tradition running roughly through Hegel and Rawls, and
represents a goal of that tradition: to help people see the virtues of their
political orders rather than be alienated from them; to allow them to have a
sense of genuine belonging in their societies.231 I submit that the task of
reconciliation is particularly urgent in democratic constitutional theory, for
while people who see their societies as merely unjust might seek to use
democratic processes to change them, those who see their societies as
undemocratic may perceive themselves as lacking nonviolent options.
Nonetheless, as Rawls recognized, there is a danger that reconciliationdriven political theory may become “ideological in Marx’s sense”—in other
words, it may be “used corruptly as a defense of an unjust and unworthy
status quo.”232 Fortunately, Douglass and his intellectual heirs show a path to
reconciliation without ideology. The injustice of the status quo can be
recognized, but the claims to rightness issued by the defenders of the status
quo can nonetheless be used as a moral resource to bring the community to
a place where genuine reconciliation is possible.
Hegel captured the idea of reconciliation through the metaphor of being
“at home” in one’s society.233 That metaphor resonates far too well with the
history of Black activism to not extend it here. American writer and poet
Audre Lorde once said that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the
master’s house.”234 Well, maybe they won’t—but Douglass asks us to use
those tools to renovate it into a space that can accommodate those who had
been the slaves. Builders and realtors will say that an uninhabitable house on
a solid foundation has “good bones”; Douglass and his intellectual heirs have
seen that our Constitution has good bones too, even it takes a truly heroic
amount of work to bring those bones out.
For those reasons, Black constitutional patriotism gives Americans of
all races genuine reason to adhere to the Constitution in potentia. And they
give constitutional and democratic theorists of all countries an intellectual
warrant to accept a version of the constitutional conception of popular

231

See generally JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 3–4 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001);
Michael O. Hardimon, The Project of Reconciliation: Hegel’s Social Philosophy, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
165, 165 (1992).
232 RAWLS, supra note 231, at 4 n.4.
233 Hardimon, supra note 231, at 168.
234 AUDRE LORDE, THE MASTER’S TOOLS WILL NEVER DISMANTLE THE MASTER’S HOUSE (1983),
reprinted in FEMINIST POSTCOLONIAL THEORY: A READER 25, 25 (Reina Lewis & Sara Mills eds., 2003).
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sovereignty that recognizes that in deeply unjust aspirant democracies, the
capacity for popular authorship must be built in struggle and faith, not merely
exercised in the discursive politics of the already-included.

413

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

414

